

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Case:1078

Archivist: Kelly Barton

DOC	TYPE	DATE	PAGES	CLASS.	CLOSED
1	Cable	05/18/1987	5		01-14-2003
	NSC #: WHORM Subject #: To: From: Subject: 182132Z MAY 87 Restriction : FOIA(b)1	R 3/20/86	NUSF97-066/4		#38
2	Report	ND	3		01-14-2003
	NSC #: WHORM Subject #: To: From: Subject: re zero option Restriction : FOIA(b)1	R	11	"	#39
3	Message	ND	1		01-14-2003
	NSC #: WHORM Subject #: To: From: Subject: re negotiating instructions for Moscow Restriction : FOIA(b)1	R	"	"	7140
4	Memo To: Baker From: Dawson WiseMen Mtg with Pres on INF	4/27/87	1 partial		8/20/83
	Bb				

COLLECTION: Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files

SERIES: I. Subject File

TITLE: Arms Control May 20, 1987 [April-May 1987]

OA/ID NUMBER:

BOX NUMBER: 1

Folder #: 6 of 17

Restriction Codes

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
 PRA-1 -National Security Classified Information.
 PRA-2 -Relating to the appointment to Federal Office.
 PRA-3 -Release would violate a Federal statute.
 PRA-4 -Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
 PRA-5 -Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors.
 PRA-6 -Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
 C -Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donors' deed of gift.
 PRM. -Closed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
 FOIA(b)(1) -National security classified information.
 FOIA(b)(2) -Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.
 FOIA(b)(3) -Release would violate a Federal statute.
 FOIA(b)(4) -Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information.
 FOIA(b)(6) -Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
 FOIA(b)(7) -Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
 FOIA(b)(8) -Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions.
 FOIA(b)(9) -Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells.

DOC	TYPE	DATE	PAGES	CLASS.	CLOSED
4	Memorandum	04-27-1987	3		04-18-2003
<u>NSC #:</u> WHORM Subject #: <u>To:</u> Senator Baker <u>From:</u> Rhett Dawson <u>Subject:</u> re "Wise Men" meetings with the President on INF (document pending further review)					

Restriction :

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 20, 1987

Howard:


The attached conversation is
consistent with what Dobrynin
told Horowitz.


Frank C. Carlucci

Attachment

cc: Ken Duberstein

SECRET ATTACHMENT





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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ACTION NODIS-00

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get it please
done

////FOLLOWING TEXT IS MOSCOW 7723////

E.O. 12356: DECL: DADR
TAGS: PARM, PREL, UR
SUBJECT: DOBRYNIN ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE DOBRYNINS ACCEPTED AN INVITATION FROM REBFCCA AND ME FOR A PRIVATE DINNER FRIDAY EVENING AND WHEN WE ROSE FROM THE TABLE DOBRYNIN SUGGESTED A TETE-A-TETE WHICH CONTINUED FOR WELL OVER AN HOUR. HE WAS MAINLY INTERESTED IN ASSESSING THE PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, AND SPENT MORE TIME TALKING THAN LISTENING. WE SPOKE ONLY RUSSIAN. SINCE--DESPITE HIS FLUENCY IN ENGLISH--I SENSED THAT HE WAS MORE RELAXED IN HIS OWN LANGUAGE AND, INDEED, HIS WORDS--DELIVERED IN THE SAME CLIPPED STOCATTO CHARACTERISTIC OF HIS ENGLISH--GUSHED FORTH IN SUCH PROFUSION THAT AT TIMES I HAD DIFFICULTY FINDING OPENINGS TO INSERT MY OWN COMMENTS. IN GENERAL, HIS SUBSTANTIVE MESSAGE WAS CONSISTED WITH THE ONE YOU RECEIVED FROM BESSMERTNYKH, BUT THE UNDERLYING QUESTION, TO WHICH HE RETURNED REPEATEDLY, WAS: DOES THE ADMINISTRATION REALLY WANT TO CONCLUDE AN INF

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AGREEMENT--AND IF IT DOES, DOES IT HAVE THE POLITICAL WILL AND POLITICAL CLOUT TO BRING AN AGREEMENT TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION?

3. ON THIS POINT I ASSURED HIM THAT THE ADMINISTRATION IS TOTALLY SERIOUS ABOUT CONCLUDING REAL ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS. BUT OF COURSE COULD NOT ACCEPT SOME OF THE CURRENT SOVIET POSITIONS. THEREFORE, IF THEY ARE SERIOUS, THE SOVIETS MUST TAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE REMAINING ISSUES AND BE PREPARED TO WORK THEM OUT WITHOUT UNNECESSARY DELAY.

4. OTHER COMMENTS WHICH DOBRYNIN OFFERED WERE THE FOLLOWING:

--A CLAIM THAT THE START PROPOSAL YOU BROUGHT LAST MONTH MADE A "BAD IMPRESSION" ON GORBACHEV. SINCE IT SEEMED A "RETREAT" FROM THE REYKJAVIK FORMULA.

--A STATEMENT THAT HE WAS "ASTOUNDED" BY THE ALLIED RESISTANCE TO THEIR SRIN PROPOSAL. SINCE THEY CONSIDERED THEIR PROPOSAL A MAJOR CONCESSION TO THE WESTERN POSITION.

--A PREFERENCE FOR WORKING ON AN AGREEMENT ON 'BASIC ELEMENTS' OF A START AGREEMENT ON THE PRACTICAL GROUNDS THAT TIME PROBABLY WILL NOT PERMIT NEGOTIATION OF A COMPLETE TREATY TEXT.

--REPEATED ASSERTIONS THAT NO START AGREEMENT COULD BE CONCLUDED UNLESS THERE WAS A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE CONNECTED WITH SDI AND THE ABM TREATY.

5. I REPLIED TO THESE COMMENTS ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

~~SECRET~~



EX-PL-1000-10

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--THE PRESIDENT IS EAGER TO MOVE AHEAD WITH SOUND AGREEMENTS FOR FAIR AND BALANCED ARMS REDUCTION BUT WILL NOT SACRIFICE A VIABLE SDI RESEARCH AND TESTING PROGRAM TO ATTAIN THIS GOAL. (TO THIS DOBRYNIN COMMENTED THAT GORBACHEV UNDERSTOOD THIS FACT- AND WAS WILLING TO "LET THE PRESIDENT HAVE HIS PROGRAM" HOWEVER, GORBACHEV--HE SAID- COULD NOT CONCEDE AN AMERICAN RIGHT TO DEPLOY SDI AT SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE, AND HAD TO HAVE SOME UNDERSTANDING OF JUST WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE BETWEEN TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT--PARTICULARLY IN SPACE.)

--REGARDING OUR PROPOSAL FOR A 50 PERCENT REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS OVER A SEVEN-YEAR PERIOD I POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS AN HONEST ATTEMPT ON OUR PART TO FIND A COMPROMISE SOLUTION TO THE REYKJAVIK IMPASSE.

DOBRYNIN SAID HE COULD UNDERSTAND THE LOGIC OF OUR MOVE, BUT REPEATED THAT "PSYCHOLOGICALLY" THE EFFECT WAS BAD, SINCE IT INVOLVED A LONGER-PERIOD FOR THE 50 PERCENT REDUCTION THAN WAS DISCUSSED AT REYKJAVIK, AND A SHORTER PERIOD OF NON-WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ARM TREATY.

--REGARDING THE POSITION OF THE ALLIES ON SRINE, I REMINDED HIM OF THE VERY LEGITIMATE CONCERNS OF THE WEST EUROPEANS REGARDING THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE AND POTENTIAL DECOUPLING. DOBRYNIN RETORDED BY SAYING

THAT THE DECISION TO OFFER ZERO IN EUROPE WAS A DIFFICULT ONE FOR THEM AND WAS MADE BY GORBACHEV PERSONALLY "TO AVOID UNBECOMING AND PETTY HAGGLING OVER NUMBER"--IN THE FULL EXPECTATION THAT IT WOULD BE GREETED BY THE U.S. AND WEST EUROPEANS AS A FORWARD

MOVE. "HOWEVER--IF YOU DON'T WANT IT" DOBRYNIN ADDED--"WE CAN DO AN INF AGREEMENT WITHOUT IT."

--AS FOR WORKING ON A "BASIC ELEMENTS" AGREEMENT FOR

SECRET



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START, I POINTED OUT THAT A TREATY WOULD BE A MUCH BETTER GOAL, AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS WOULD DEAL WITH IT PROMPTLY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY. DOBRYNIN SAID THAT THEY HAVE NOTHING AGAINST NEGOTIATING A TREATY PER SE. IT IS SIMPLY THEIR JUDGMENT THAT WE MAY HAVE TIME ONLY FOR SOMETHING MORE LIMITED, SUCH AS AN AGREEMENT ON BASIC ELEMENTS, SIMILAR TO VLADIVOSTAK. I COMMENTED THAT WE WOULD HARDLY CONSIDER VLADIVOSTAK ON ENCOURAGING PRECEDENT--AND INDEED IT ILLUSTRATES SOME OF THE REAL PITFALLS INHERENT IN AN AGREEMENT WHICH DOES NOT INCLUDE THE DETAILS.

6. PICKING UP ON HIS COMMENT ABOUT THE "BAD IMPRESSION" LEFT BY OUR PROPOSAL FOR 50 PERCENT START REDUCTIONS OVER A SEVEN YEAR PERIOD, I ASKED HIM IF IT WOULD BE CORRECT TO INFER THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT FOR THE SOVIETS IS THE LENGTH OF TIME THE PARTIES AGREE NOT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ABM TREATY. HE AVOIDED CONFIRMING THIS, BUT COMMENTED THAT THEY HAD INTERPRETED OUR PROPOSAL AS MEANING (A) THAT WE CANNOT DEPLOY SDI FOR SEVEN YEARS IN ANY EVENT, AND (B) THAT THE U.S. WANTS TO SET IN MOTION A PROCESS TO BREAK THE ABM TREATY AT THAT TIME. HE THEN ADDED THAT IT IS THE LATTER SITUATION WHICH THEY CANNOT ACCEPT. I TOLD HIM THAT THEIR ANALYSIS WAS NOT CORRECT--THAT WE ARE OFFERING COMMITMENTS WHICH IN FACT WILL SHOW THE DEVELOPMENT OF SDI, AND THAT IT WOULD BE QUITE UNREALISTIC IF THE SOVIETS WERE TO DEMAND AN ULTIMATE VETO OVER SDI DEPLOYMENT.

7. COMMENT: THERE WAS NOTHING SURPRISING OR NEW ABOUT THE POINTS DOBRYNIN MADE. HOWEVER I WAS STRUCK BY HIS PERSISTENT EFFORT TO PORTRAY GORBACHEV AS A MAN IN A HURRY TO WRAP UP SOME AGREEMENTS. HE REPEATEDLY SAID THAT GORBACHEV DISLIKES "PETTY TRADING" AND



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PREFER THE GRAND GESTURE TO NITPICKING THE DETAILS.
HE ALSO ASKED REPEATEDLY ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMITMENT TO CONCLUDING AGREEMENTS AND (IMPLICITLY)
HIS POLITICAL STRENGTH TO CARRY THEM THROUGH
PARTICULARLY WITH FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON NOW CRITICAL
OF OUR INF POSITION. (HE OBSERVED WRYLY BY THE WAY,
THAT WE HAD EXTRACTED FROM THEM A MUCH BETTER DEAL FOR
THE U. S. THAN NIXON AND KISSINGER EVER HAD AND THOUGH
HE COULD UNDERSTAND KISSINGER'S CRITICISM ON
"EGOTISTICAL GROUNDS"--(I.E., IT WAS NOT HIS IDEA--HE
WAS SURPRISED BY NIXON'S CRITICISM) I ASSURED HIM
THAT THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE SUCH
MATTERS HAS IN NO WAY BEEN AFFECTED BY UNRELATED
MATTERS SUCH AS "IRANGATE," AND THAT IF THEY WERE
WILLING TO NEGOTIATE CONSTRUCTIVELY AND FAIRLY THEY
WOULD CERTAINLY FIND THE PRESIDENT RESPONSIVE. I
CAUTIONED HIM, HOWEVER, THAT THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT
"NEED" AN AGREEMENT FOR AGREEMENT'S SAKE AND WOULD NOT
MAKE ONE-SIDED CONCESSIONS TO ACHIEVE ONE

8. MY OVERALL CONCLUSION--BASED ON MUCH MORE THAN
THIS ONE CONVERSATION--IS THAT GORBACHEV DOES SEE IT
IN HIS INTEREST TO WRAP UP AN AGREEMENT--AT LEAST ON
INF--THIS YEAR. THEY KNOW WE ARE MORE INTERESTED IN
START, AND WANT TO USE THIS INTEREST TO BRING PRESSURE
TO BEAR ON SDI. BUT THE BOTTOM LINE SEEMS TO BE THAT
GORBACHEV HAS AN INCREASING STAKE IN CONCLUDING AN
AGREEMENT HE CAN POINT TO AS A CONCRETE ACHIEVEMENT OF
HIS LEADERSHIP. THE DOMESTIC SOVIETarena DOES NOT
OFFER PROMISING MATERIAL FOR QUICK RESULTS AND IF HE
IS TO CLAIM SUCCESS IN THE NEAR TERM, HE HAS FAR
ALTERNATIVES TO SEEKING IT IN THE U.S. SOVIET
RELATIONSHIP.

MATLOCK

SECRET

WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE ZERO OPTION?Origin

The Zero Option was put forward in 1981 by DOD as a ploy to stop INF negotiations. It was assumed by the proponents that, after the expected Soviet rejection, negotiations would be stopped. The allies went along as a means to blunt the mass demonstrations against INF then tearing at their countries. Neither side of the Atlantic ever expected the proposal to be accepted. No serious strategic or political analysis of its implications was ever undertaken.

Military Implications

-- The argument that we are trading 300 warheads for 1000 is superficial and misleading.

-- The Soviet arsenal to attack Europe is virtually unlimited in relation to the conceivable targets. The Soviets have 700 short-range missiles that can cover Europe and thousands of surplus ICBM warheads, not to speak of hundreds of medium-range airplanes. The Soviet capacity to attack Europe with nuclear weapons is therefore not significantly reduced, if at all. The U. S. capacity to retaliate from Europe is eliminated.

-- An attack in Europe would therefore have to be countered by the threat of U. S. strategic forces from the United States.

-- In short, the proposed agreement brings no discernible military benefit. It increases the weight of both Soviet conventional superiority and its nuclear arsenal.

Political Implications

-- The willingness of the U. S. to initiate strategic war from its territory in response to nuclear threats or blackmail against Europe is a function of two factors: its military significance; its credibility. Both will be inevitably declining under the theory of mutual destruction and the Zero Option.

-- The Soviet Union can threaten Europe as a national decision. America must defend Europe as an alliance decision.

-- This inherent inequality was eased by the INF deployment. So long as missiles capable of reaching Soviet territory are deployed in Europe, a Soviet nuclear threat against Europe faces the possibility of nearly automatic nuclear retaliation. This would even be true to some extent of conventional attack. The Soviets might conclude that the U. S. would not be prepared to permit its missiles to be overrun without using them, and they

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would not dare to attack the missiles without also attacking other U. S. strategic systems. Thus the defense of Europe and the United States are "coupled." By the same token, the proposed agreement "decouples" the defense of Europe and the United States.

-- To reach agreement with the USSR on the Zero Option, then, will reintroduce into the trans-Atlantic relationship a deeply divisive issue. The heavy political costs Allied governments paid in demonstrations and leftist opposition when the deployments were taking place will come back to haunt us. Friendly governments will ask whether the cost was worth it. It is highly unlikely that future governments will be ready to pay the price again if the Soviets deploy new systems and we seek to respond by equivalent deployments. In short, the Soviets will have gained a veto over NATO nuclear deployments. A giant step towards the eventual denuclearization of Europe will have been taken. The fact that no European leader is prepared to say publicly what he thinks accentuates the problem.

-- The Asian situation is nearly as complex. Both Japanese and Chinese leaders resent the 100 warheads left in Asia. The Soviet motivation is obvious: They do not need an additional 100 warheads to attack Japan or China. They do benefit from an American agreement that discriminates against those countries as against Europe.

-- Painful as it is to say, the proposed INF agreement has next to no advantage for the United States and major long-term benefits for the Soviet Union.

Possible Alternative

-- Problems are not resolved by a simple insistence that we cannot reach agreement on the Zero Option unless the Soviets agree to reduce or eliminate short-range systems as well, unless the U. S. is prepared to stand by that position and refuse an agreement unless short-range systems are included.

-- Yet that position would be portrayed by the Soviets, the West European left, and many in the U. S. as an artifice to avoid an agreement -- particularly since it was not a part of our earlier Zero Option offer.

-- Further, we must remember that we have nothing to trade for reduced numbers of Soviet short-range systems -- an inherently weak negotiating position.

-- At this point the best course is probably to shift our public and private stance to one which declares zero to be our ultimate goal, but that this goal should be arrived at in stages.

-- Our staged withdrawal could get both sides down to a 200 warhead level.

-- Once this reduced level is reached further reductions should be made dependent on elimination of short-range systems and conventional reductions.

Negotiating Instructions for Moscow

It is highly likely that the Soviets will try to steamroller our delegation in Moscow to an agreement in principle on as close to the Reykjavik formula on strategic weapons as they can get.

This would have the following disadvantages:

- a. It would reopen the entire acrimonious Reykjavik debate.
- b. It would link INF again to SDI.
- c. It would enable the Soviets to define the issues.
- d. It would reduce the White House to ratifying what is negotiated elsewhere.

Recommendation: That the delegation be instructed to confine discussions to INF matters and leave other issues for later.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

ADMINISTRATIVELY SENSITIVE WASHINGTON

April 27, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR SENATOR BAKER

FROM: Rhett B. Dawson *PK*

SUBJECT: "Wise Men" Meetings with the President on INF

This is to report on a number of conversations regarding positions on the LRINF/SRINF proposal of a variety of respected individuals. The individuals listed below were, in most instances, contacted directly by me; but, in a few cases are the result of discussions with others. During these conversations, opinions only were sought, no commitments were made. All individuals who might be candidates are included whether in or out of government, except negotiators, cabinet officers or NSC officials.

Those generally positive about the INF proposal:

Jim Schlesinger -- considers himself the chief defender outside of government and the arms control fraternity of the SRINF/LRINF proposal. Could offset his tendency to talk down to people by noting his recent McNeil-Lehrer appearance (Tab A). Believes April 26th Nixon-Kissinger Post Op-ed (Tab B) to be hypocrisy by those who negotiated interim SALT agreement's unequal limits. Was critical of Reykjavik (Tab C). Will say this is pretty good agreement; not perfect because the Soviets are bound to have some purpose in pursuing it. Concerned about letting the opposition monopolize the debate and be the only voice the press hears.

Richard Perle -- articulate Administration policy-maker who strongly favors and views the U.S. acceptance of the Soviet offer as a continuation of our 1981 zero-option proposal. Opponents of the INF proposal characterize Richard's position as stemming from contempt for NATO. Leaving town Tuesday at 3:00 p.m. Ikle believes Cap would not be offended if Perle sees President.

Paul Nitze -- adviser and architect of arms control proposal, privately campaigning within and without Administration to marshal INF supporters.

Dave Abshire -- very supportive former NATO ambassador REDACTED Does not believe this will affect Alliance if accompanied by technologically inspired conventional defense solutions.

Zbigniew Brzezinski -- will go along with proposal with reservation and be gratified by opportunity to brief the President. Prefers "100 to 100" or real "zero to zero" before "100 in Asia and continental U.S." Would make it clear that under no circumstances should we reduce tactical nuclear weapons without significant reduction in Soviet tanks. Recommends against talking to left-of-center "arms control" fraternity. Believes Nixon-Kissinger concerns about decoupling could be self-fulfilling prophecy.

Mel Laird -- supportive, skillful insider but not as thoroughly briefed as many, offered (as did Schlesinger) to put together "formers" (Secretaries of State, Defense and National Security Advisers) to make case for INF. Believes proposal is word-for-word what we offered in '81.

Harold Brown -- often woolly, but, extremely analytical bent, has, at times been outspoken SDI critic.

Albert Wohlstetter -- supportive, brilliant but preachy, almost impossible to hold to 15 minutes, tends to have pet projects.

Bill Crowe -- unlike other chiefs, reputed to be "on-board", currently reviewing military sufficiency of proposal.

Gerard Smith/Paul Warnke/Spurgeon Keeney/McGeorge Bundy -- the "arms control" fraternity -- arms control for its own sake. Of these, former National Security Adviser Mac Bundy is most "neutral", although as to all questions might be raised that proposal is outside of center and out of touch with U.S. opinion. None contacted.

Those with generally negative opinion of INF proposal:

President Nixon -- previously discussed with you. Out of respect for presidency wrote subdued Post op-ed (Tab D). Henry Kissinger -- along with Nixon, privately hyper critical of INF proposal e.g. has stated that the proposal is "worst thing since World War II", however, the "best" on this subject.

Brent Scowcroft -- while critical of proposal (principally on grounds of its effect on Alliance politics) compared to two above; restrained, mellow, reasonable and well-respected.

John Tower -- believes we are moving too fast. May get "trap" sprung on us and drift toward permanent conventional inferiority, will leave "bad taste" in mouth of Alliance (Tower close to conservatives in U.K. and FRG). Would want strong assurances we've looked at military implications. In D.C. Wednesday but could adjust. A concern: should avoid having two Tower Board members.

Bernie Rogers -- strongly opposed but may be partly based on loss to SACEUR of weapons under his control and reliance on CINCSAC. A number of individuals strongly recommended that Rogers be talked to in any event to later be able to say we heard him out although it is doubtful he would be mollified. One suggestion was to do this in conjunction with courtesy call with him as on outgoing SACEUR.

Alexander Haig -- Former SACEUR, similar position to Rogers. Critical of President's management style bordering on bitterness apparently stemming from President's first term.

George Will -- publicly criticized both proposal and management style. Concerns raised by others about crucial advice being provided by columnist on matter how well-respected.

Les Aspin -- op-ed lays out position (Tab F). Viewed as in difficult political position long-term. Some believe position not well thought out.

A

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ROUGH DRAFT #3013

MACNEIL/LEHRER NEWS HOUR

April 15, 1987

Intro

JIM LEHRER: Good evening. Leading the news this Wednesday, Secretary Shultz ended his Moscow mission, saying agreement with the Soviets on European missiles is near, and charging the U.S. Embassy is a "honeycomb" of Soviet bugs. We'll have the details in our news summary in a moment. Robin?

ROBERT MacNEIL: After the news summary, we look at the Shultz talks in Moscow first with an update from Bill Beecher of the Minneapolis Star Tribune, and then an analysis by former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, former National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, and Prince Kremlin watcher Stephen Cohen. Then, a documentary report on the threat to major league baseball in Seattle. And finally, essayist Aaron Freeman looks at political pop music.

LEHRER: We have turned over the bulk of the program tonight to Secretary Shultz's three days in Moscow. Diplomatic correspondent William Beecher is with Shultz in Brussels now, and with us from there tonight. He is joined back here by former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, former National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, and Soviet analyst Stephen Cohen. Shultz himself is first. He held a lengthy news conference before leaving Moscow. It followed his fourth and final session this morning with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. The questions ranged from summit prospects to espionage, but the Secretary focused mostly on arms control. Here's an extended excerpt.

Secretary SHULTZ: Let me review very briefly where we stand on some of the leading issues of arms control. First, on the subject that we call INF negotiations -- the Soviets refer to it as medium-range missiles -- I think we made quite a lot of progress. And perhaps we can see the prospect with some hard negotiations ahead -- but nevertheless prospect -- close to hand of reaching an agreement in that area. The basic structure of that agreement would be first the Reykjavik formula of 100 long-range warheads on each

side to be deployed on the Soviet side in Asia, on the U.S. side in the United States. I might say that we continue to advocate the complete elimination of these weapons, but if the Soviet side doesn't agree to their elimination, we will still agree to 100. We have narrowed down the timeframe for this reduction as somewhere in the four to five year range. We both agree that these agreements must contain provisions for very strict and intrusive verification. The U.S. side has tabled in the form of a draft treaty our ideas on this subject in Geneva. And we were told here that the Soviets agree on the importance of strict verification, and that they will bring us their ideas when we return to Geneva -- which will be April 23 for the INF negotiations. An issue of importance as yet unresolved but which we made considerable progress, in my opinion, involves what we refer to as short-range INF missiles, a two-weapons system that are involved there. We agree that there will be limits on the numbers of these weapons. We agree that whatever limits there are, the only workable concept is a global concept, since these weapons are very mobile, can be transported easily -- so you have to put it in global terms. The principle of equality is one that governs our relationship, and we believe it must govern in this field as well. If we can settle all of the issues in the present negotiation, well and good. And we intend to give this matter a first priority as we return on April 23 to the discussions in Geneva. The Soviet side has told us that they intend upon signing of an INF agreement to take the missiles they now have stationed in the GDR and Czechoslovakia out and destroy them. And that in the negotiations over the remaining missiles, they will take the position that the right equal number should be zero. This is a new proposal, and this afternoon they added to it, zero to be accomplished within a year. We are a member of a strong alliance, and on matters of this importance, of course, we don't respond immediately, we consult carefully with our allies, and I will start that process tomorrow at Brussels. But I think in summary I can say that very considerable headway has been made, and it should be possible to work out an agreement in this field with hard work and creative efforts.

REPORTER: Do you expect some leeway as you talk to your NATO allies on this topic, or have you found some flexibility in your discussions with the Soviets' new proposal that they might be willing to agree to limits that are not zero on SRINF?

Secretary SHULTZ: Well, of course, the Soviets will speak for themselves. I am reporting to you the results of our meetings, and I will consult with allies, as we will have to consider this new offer and I can't tell you the outcome of that, because we haven't had the consultation yet. It's clear that there are a variety of viewpoints, but we will consult and I am sure come to a good conclusion.

VOICE OF BARRY SCHWEID, Associated Press: Mr. Secretary, apart from handing Mr. Gorbachev a letter from the President, did you discuss the prospects of a summit, or is your position still "the welcome mat is out and it's up to the Soviets to act on."

Secretary SHULTZ: Well, there was more discussion of that subject between you and the General Secretary and elsewhere. We had [incomprehensible] following the Washington convention of shouting questions at us. I told him he didn't need to answer you, but he did anyway.

REPORTER: Well, he gave us a story for one day.

Secretary SHULTZ: The subject was discussed a little bit, but as you can see our discussion focused on substance rather than on that meeting. I think it's fair to say that both we and the Soviets have the similar view that such a meeting ought to be associated with some important content, and that it ought to be a well-prepared meeting. And so that is the way we approached it.

LEHRER: After that news conference, Shultz was interviewed on Soviet

television. He talked about the bugging of the Moscow Embassy and what effect it might have on U.S.-Soviet relations.

Secretary SHULTZ: I walked through the new building that you have now turned over to us as a shell building for us to finish. And I could see with my own eyes what has been done there. And I've seen pictures of other places. So undoubtedly, it's there. And as I told your leadership, we have to have a lot of respect for the technical capability of your intelligence service. You do a good job. But we can deal with it -- but it gets so oppressive and constant. You're always watching. You're always trying to get in there. And it's a disgrace that you were able turn these two young people and get access to our embassy. And that's been a very difficult thing for us, and of course, we're mad at ourselves as well as you. But you can raise the cost so high to running an embassy here that we wonder how is it possible? I don't know what it's going to take to fix this building, but it's going to be quite a job. But to go back to your basic question -- whether or not these events somehow get timed for meetings. The answer is no. The problems that we had last fall that resulted from your unjustified arrest of a journalist, Mr. Danilov -- you're a journalist, you might have had some feeling for him -- and all the other things that became related to that -- were there because they occurred. And the problems that we have now result from the fact that they occurred. Not because of anybody's timing. But the fact that I am here, the fact that President Reagan went to Geneva -- that he went to Reykjavik, that we have an invitation to General Secretary Gorbachev to come to the United States -- all showed, I think, the very firm purpose widely shared in the United States that we wish for a better relationship with you, and we think that if there is one, we will have a more peaceful prospect in the world.

LEHRER: Now to some stateside reaction to Mr. Shultz's mission. First from James Schlesinger who served as Defense Secretary and CIA Director in the Nixon and Ford administrations and Energy Secretary in the Carter administration. He is now a senior counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies here in Washington. Mr. Schlesinger, first, was it a successful mission for Secretary Shultz and the United States of America?

JAMES SCHLESSINGER, former Defense Secretary: It looks like a very successful mission, indeed. There will be things to be done, as the Secretary has indicated, lot of hard negotiations before one has an agreement. It will be necessary to be very careful about the verification problems, but the agreement -- the prospective agreement -- looks very attractive. And it would be, I think, unwise for us even to contemplate turning it down.

LEHRER: Why? Why is it so attractive?

Mr. SCHLESSINGER: Well, if you go back to 1977, when Chancellor Schmidt first raised the question of the SS-20, the Europeans have been pressing --

LEHRER: This is the Soviets' intermediate-range missiles --

Mr. SCHLESSINGER: With three warheads -- the modernized version. They have been pressing us to equalize it or to negotiate it out of existence. In 1979 NATO, our European friends, adopted a dual tracks strategy, in which we would negotiate to get rid of them -- at the same time that we deploy. The Europeans pressed the Reagan administration early on. And elicited the President's speech of November 1981, with the zero option, which the Europeans endorsed. The Soviets have finally said yes.

LEHRER: We'll get rid of all the intermediate --

Mr. SCHLESSINGER: We'll get rid of all of them -- they have accepted our option. We have got to learn to take yes for an answer. And we cannot at this stage begin to find difficulties other than the final processes of negotiations.

LEHRER: But when it's all said and done, the United States and the West -- if this deal goes the way Secretary Shultz outlined it just now in this news conference, and we do take yes for an answer, the United States and the West will be better off?

Mr. SCHLESSINGER: We will be far better off. In the first place, the Soviet Union will be turning in 1300 warheads that are pointed -- of the INF variety -- pointed against Europe. Some additional warheads -- probably in the shorter-range missiles -- that is a major reduction in the threat against Europe. Now, there are those in Europe -- and a few in the United States -- who are worried about the denuclearization of NATO, as they call it. And they quite rightly point to Soviet superiority in conventional forces and that we must have a nuclear capability to continue to deter them. But we will have--

LEHRER: Explain why -- explain to me how that argument goes -- that if they have an overwhelming -- well, you can do it better than I can.

Mr. SCHLESSINGER: If they have an overwhelming conventional force, they may choose either to invade Western Europe, or intimidate the Western European nations. And unless we have a nuclear capability that serves as an equalizer to their advantages in the conventional area, they may just choose to be aggressive.

LEHRER: Are we giving that up with this deal?

Mr. SCHLESSINGER: We're not giving that up -- and that's the important thing. One hears from Europe exaggerations -- a nuclear Munich, the denuclearization of Europe. What the Europeans will have will be first the British and French forces, which will survive intact. We will also--

LEHRER: They have their own nuclear force.

Mr. SCHLESSINGER: They have their submarine forces and very small landbase forces. Those are not subject to negotiations. In addition to that, we have the F-111 fighters in England, which are nuclear capable. We have hundreds of fighters deployed in Germany, which are nuclear capable. We'll have the shorter-range missiles, including the land systems, and tube artillery -- all of which are nuclear capable. The issue of the denuclearization of NATO is a false issue. And this will be for the United States and for the West a desirable outcome. But more important even than that, is the politics of our turning this aside would be devastating in terms of public opinion here -- but even more importantly in Western Europe.

LEHRER: Mr. Secretary, thank you. Robin?

MacNEIL: Next, we have McGeorge Bundy, who served as National Security Advisor under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. He was an advisor in two summit meetings -- the Kennedy Kruschev talks in Vienna in 1961, and the Johnson Kosygin meeting in Glassboro, Pennsylvania, in 1967. He's now a professor of history at New York University. Mr. Bundy, do you agree that this agreement that is shaping up looks very attractive to the U.S. and the West?

McGEORGE BUNDY, former National Security Advisor: I do. I strongly agree. I think that this may well be the important agreement that has yet come in sight between us and the Soviet Union.

MacNEIL: What do you make of Mr. Gorbachev's sudden offer to eliminate all the short-range missiles, which seemed to be an obstacle until yesterday. The two agreed on the medium-range missiles, and the anxiety of some NATO members about what that would -- what former Secretary Schlessinger's just been talking about.

Mr. BUNDY: Well, I think what we are coming to understand now -- and it hasn't been clear really until this last week -- is that Gorbachev is extremely serious about making it as hard as possible for the alliance -- and for us in particular -- not to agree. And I take it that that means that his great interest is in the withdrawal of the intermediate forces. There's no question but what the Pershing 2 missile, which has a long-range and can very nearly -- perhaps not quite -- reach Moscow, has greatly concerned the Soviets. They are prepared to make concessions to get that out, which are larger than I, at least, would have expected. And I think that we probably owe an assist to Mrs. Thatcher for pressing home in Moscow her own concern about the short-range missiles. Those short-range missiles do have important capabilities. Some of them at least are quite modern, and I wholeheartedly agree with Jim Schlessinger that on

balance . . . or as an excellent trade to get essentially the zero-zero option we ourselves proposed and then to get in addition an unbalanced reduction, if we get it, in the short-range weapons.

MacNEIL: Do you agree with Mr. Schlessinger that denuclearization anxiety in Europe is a false issue?

Mr. BUNDY: Well, that it's a real concern for some observers is clear. It's now very much in the area--

MacNEIL: For instance, former Secretary of State Kissinger is one who has raised it.

Mr. BUNDY: Yes, he has had that kind of heavy concern with coupling. I think myself that Mr. Schlessinger is right. Paul Nitze is right in pointing out how many other systems there are that would be drawn in, or could be drawn in, at the choice of the President. Thousands of warheads will remain for the Russians to think about. Decoupling is not going to happen in any case, in my opinion, while 300,000 American troops are on the ground in the center of Europe.

MacNEIL: Mr. Shultz was reportedly instructed, because it was anticipated apparently in Washington that the Soviets might offer to get rid of the short-range missiles -- he was instructed not to accept such a deal, not to negotiate and accept that. Was that in your view only because of the anxieties of Europeans, or because that's still an unsettled policy in Washington and because there are opponents of that in Washington?

Mr. BUNDY: I don't have a close sense of what is going on inside the administration, but certainly on the evidence of what we have seen since 1981, it is I think a good guess that there are different judgments in different parts of the Executive Branch, and that it seemed easier for the President to wait and to decide when he knew what it was exactly that was being proposed -- and when, further, Secretary Shultz had had a chance to get first reactions from allies in Europe.

MacNEIL: We'll come back, Jim?

LEHRER: A third opinion from Stephen Cohen, a professor of Soviet politics and history at Princeton University and author of "Sovietiquette" -- a book with a subtitle "American Perceptions and Soviet Realities." He joins us tonight from Princeton, New Jersey -- did I pronounce the title of your book right by the way?

STEPHEN COHEN, Princeton University: It was close.

LEHRER: Do you agree that this is a deal the United States must accept?

Mr. COHEN: I agree one hundred percent, for so many reasons. It's good for us, it's good for the world, and it's good for Gorbachev inside the Soviet Union.

LEHRER: Why is what's good for Gorbachev inside the Soviet Union good for the United States?

Mr. COHEN: Because he's committed himself and his career to reforming the Soviet Union in ways that would please any decent person, making it a more relaxed and liberalized society. He has an enormous struggle on his hands, and it's going to last for years. He's also committed -- partly for that reason -- to a process of arms control and detente which would be good for everyone outside the Soviet Union as well.

LEHRER: How are those two issues related -- detente on the outside, reform on the inside?

Mr. COHEN: I think they're related in a lot of ways. First of all, there's the economic issue and the technological issue. A Soviet Union locked in a cold war with the United States is a Soviet Union that must commit not only its finances, but its limited technology and its engineers to an eternal arms race -- such as a race in space. That technology, those engineers, those funds are needed at home for the national reconstruction. Secondly, it's a question of Mr. Gorbachev's credibility as a national leader. He's a leader with opposition at home. His ability to be effective abroad, say with the United States, can

enhance his stature at home as a reform leader, and his failures abroad -- and let me say that up to this point, after two years of dealing with the United States and despite one concession after another to the United States -- he has nothing but failures to show back home. That undercuts his credibility as a leader at home.

LEHRER: Is it your position then -- or your analysis -- that Gorbachev made all the moves these last two years?

Mr. COHEN: Well, you know, we have kind of a tradition in America where we never say anything good about the Soviet Union, even if they do something good. But I think any objective observer would say that over these last two years virtually all the major concessions on the weapons issues -- and one could list them very easily -- have been made by the Soviet government, by Gorbachev, and up until this point the folks in the Reagan administration have not taken yes for an answer. Now, Mr. Schlessinger seems convinced that the Reagan administration is about to take Gorbachev's concession, yes, for an answer. I think that we should be cautious. There are powerful forces in Washington who are opposed to this agreement, they've scuttled them before. I don't think the struggle in Washington is over yet.

LEHRER: Define those forces.

Mr. COHEN: I don't know them by name. I assume they're associated with Secretary Weinberger in the Department of Defense. They have made clear their opposition to these types of arms control agreements. I don't assume they've been converted to arms control in the last day or two.

LEHRER: Well, let's say they remain unconverted, and let's say they prevail and for some reason this deal falls through the crack somewhere along the way. What would be the consequences of that?

Mr. COHEN: Inside the Soviet Union, the consequences would be to further weaken Gorbachev's policy of conciliation and concession to the United States. You don't have to be an expert on the Soviet Union to use your common sense. All you have to do is remember, here is a relatively new leader, locked in a struggle over reform at home, who has pursued a policy of concession towards the United States, and in return he's gotten nothing. It could make him look -- it makes him look in some quarters in the Soviet Union -- like a weak leader who does not understand the United States, or what they call the American threat.

LEHRER: Well, what would you say to those who say, "Hey, if we build him up and have him become strong, then he is later in a position to really turn on us."

Mr. COHEN: You know, this is the new issue that's going to be debated in the United States, I think. Up until about two or three months ago, the prevailing opinion was that Gorbachev was not really a reform leader at home, it was all public relations or cosmetics. Now, even the cold war lobby understands that he is serious about reform at home, and their backup argument is that a reformed Russia would be bad for America, because it would be more efficient, it would be a more potent international competitor. I think that's nonsense. I think it shows a lack of compassion for the way people live in the Soviet Union, whose lives will be improved. It fails to understand that a reformed Russia is a more relaxed Russia. It fails to understand that a Russia who builds fewer nuclear weapons is a less threatening Russia. I can't imagine why anybody would argue that a reformed Russia is bad for the United States.

LEHRER: Stephen Cohen, thank you, Robin?

MacNEIL: We turn now to our diplomatic analyst, William Beecher, Washington Bureau Chief for the Minneapolis Star & Tribune. Mr. Beecher has been traveling with Secretary of State Shultz to Moscow, and joins us from the studio in Brussels. Bill Beecher, have you been listening for the last three interviews?

WILLIAM BEECHER, Minneapolis Star & Tribune: Yes I have.

MacNEIL: We had three rather very favorable views of this prospective

agreement here. Is this positive view of what is in prospect shared in the American team you've been traveling with?

Mr. BEECHER: I think generally speaking, they think if an INF -- if an intermediate-range missile agreement can be achieved and a summit used to assign that treaty, that would be positive in a couple of regards. One, it will signal an improved relationship between the two countries. Second, it should open the way to a process for accelerating the other arms issues that are being negotiated between the sides.

MacNEIL: Several of these gentlemen have said in effect this evening that this is a deal as it shapes up as we heard Secretary Shultz outlining it a moment ago -- that the U.S. and the West can't afford to refuse. Are you getting that kind of feeling from the U.S. delegation?

Mr. BEECHER: I think that's right. There's going to be a period of several weeks of negotiations within the NATO Alliance, but ultimately, the expectation is that West Germany -- which is the country some of whose officials are particularly concerned about having some American missiles in this gap -- the so-called gap, 300 and 600 miles, weapons that can reach into the Soviet bloc -- who will finally probably decide the public opinion in Europe is so much in favor of getting rid of weapons rather than introducing weapons, that that will be an irresistible momentum toward going along with this.

MacNEIL: Let's come back to the talks you've just been covering in Moscow. The Secretary reported progress. And said an agreement was close at hand. Have you been let in on what the progress consisted of, wherein does the progress lie?

Mr. BEECHER: Well, first, in the question of medium-range missiles, which should be the easiest of the three major arms negotiations under discussion, there are three remaining issues. You've been discussing one of them at great length tonight -- the shorter-range system -- it should be resolved within a matter of weeks. You also have the question of verifying an agreement -- in other words, demonstrating that both sides are living up to it, they've destroyed the missiles they've said they would. Gorbachev actually in a speech in Prague said the other day that he was willing to have inspectors even come into factories where missiles are produced. If in fact, when the two negotiating teams return to the arms talks in Geneva next week the Soviets put those kinds of details down on the table, that will indeed be a very positive sign. Those are the major issues in the way of that agreement. On the other two major subjects -- reducing strategic offensive weapons by 50% and the question of whether or not the United States is permitted under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to test things in space that would go into a Star Wars defense -- there was practically no progress on either of those issues at these meetings.

MacNEIL: The Americans did not regard it as significant that Mr. Gorbachev offered for the first time a definition of what was acceptable as laboratory research, which the reports back here suggest is a wider definition than has been put on the table before?

Mr. BEECHER: It is indeed a wider definition, but it would not permit any testing in space whatever. And there are opinions in the United States -- and you've heard them from the President and others -- that under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, certainly some space tests are permitted. The extent of those tests is debatable. But Mr. Gorbachev certainly has widened what before was an attempt to restrict these tests to the four walls of a laboratory, but he still would keep them restricted to the ground.

MacNEIL: So that is not regarded by the Americans as a tent under which Star Wars could be included in an agreement without being the obstacle to an agreement on strategic weapons?

Mr. BEECHER: It is not regarded as remotely acceptable, or even interesting. However, there was another part to his offer. And that was the experts from both sides should sit down and discuss what tests in space are possible. Now,

there are people in this team -- including the Secretary of State and his top Arms Control Advisor Mr. Nitze, who would in fact like to do that. They've proposed that, and they lost out in the White House.

MacNEIL: Finally, Bill Beecher, does the American -- is the position of eliminating the short-range missiles that Mr. Gorbachev offered suddenly yesterday and made clear today that it was within one year -- is that something the American delegation would like to accept? Or is that still controversial within the administration, do you believe?

Mr. BEECHER: Well, first, he didn't say it would be done in one year. He said it was possible it might be done as soon as that. No, there are differences of opinion within the delegation on that. Some would like to go along with those Europeans who want to have a token force in this area. Others think it's a terrific deal.

MacNEIL: So in other words, it's not totally those anxious NATO allies that Mr. Shultz must convince. It is still to be debated back in Washington -- is that the case?

Mr. BEECHER: There is diversity there as well. Yes.

MacNEIL: Mr. Schlesinger in Washington, what did you think of Mr. Cohen's arguments about the -- he said the real issue that's going to be debated now in the United States, if we reach an agreement on intermediate weapons, is this new line about "It is dangerous to help Gorbachev because a stronger Russia will be bad for the United States."

Mr. SCHLESSINGER: Well, let me comment just briefly on another point that he made about the resistance within the Department of Defense. The zero-zero option was a proposal from the Department of Defense that was adopted over the objections of the Department of State. The Department of Defense will find it logically quite difficult at this stage to reverse its own position and oppose the zero-zero option, which it put forward on the belief that it was so good for the United States that the Soviet Union could never accept it.

MacNEIL: Let's just get a reaction from Professor Cohen on that. Professor Cohen?

Mr. COHEN: Well, that's right. The Defense Department put it forward on the assumption that the Soviet Union wouldn't accept it. They're busy backing away from it. What they're going to tell you -- we've heard it on your show -- is that if we go for the zero option, no Soviet or American missiles in Europe, that the Soviets will be left with this incredible superiority in conventional weapons -- tanks and the lot -- and that the temptation to be aggressive therefore, without the American nuclear deterrent in Europe, would whip the Soviet Union into some dastardly act. You're going to be hearing that over the next weeks and days. That's going to be the counter-argument. It's a nonsensical argument, and it also overlooks something extraordinarily important in Gorbachev's speech in Prague only a few days ago. He addressed himself to the very American concern that if the missiles are out of Europe, the Soviet Union will have a superiority in conventional weapons. And what he said was that there is that perception in the West, and that the Soviet Union's prepared to do something about it. And what I think he said was it's prepared unilaterally to cut its conventional forces in Europe. That would be another good and very large concession to the United States. We should be talking about that as well.

MacNEIL: Secretary Schlesinger?

Mr. SCHLESSINGER: If Gorbachev is prepared to reduce the offensive power of his forces in Eastern Europe, the withdrawal of the tank armies, this would resolve the major American and Western concern that has existed basically since 1946-47. On the other question that you asked me about Professor Cohen's view -- about strengthening Gorbachev -- on balance, I agree with Professor Cohen. And there are risks, no doubt, in that helping Gorbachev, one will have a stronger Soviet Union, so if it turns on the West, it would be a more formidable foe. But that is a risk that I think that we should happily take if it

has the prospects of reducing tensions between East and West, and making the Soviet Union a more humane society.

MacNEIL: How do you feel about that, McGeorge Bundy?

Mr. BUNDY: I think it's to our advantage to make agreement, that we find on balance in our interests precisely because we do gain by increasing the understanding in each country that it is possible for us to have agreements within the wider and necessary agreement that we have to co-exist. Our first agreement of this kind came at a summit more than 30 years ago. It wasn't written down, but Eisenhower back from Geneva, and Kruschev went back from Geneva in 1955, having said to each other, face-to-face, that these two countries must not have a nuclear war. And each believed that the other meant what he said. Now, detailed agreements of the kind that is now coming in sight are very much harder. They have to be worked out with great care. There isn't a great hurry. And agreements that reduce weapons will, I think, have a reinforcing effect of just this kind. Let me say in passing that I spoke about the importance of this agreement earlier in the program. I didn't mean to say that I think it's more important than the ABM Treaty. But the ABM Treaty was a treaty not to do something neither side has yet done. This is a treaty which takes away something on which each side has put great weight.

MacNEIL: Bill Beecher, finally on this point, is this surfacing as an issue among Americans who are negotiating these things - this idea that being good for Gorbachev might in some way be bad for the West?

Mr. BEECHER: I don't think so, really. I think that most of those men are pretty experienced and they understand that Mr. Gorbachev will be judged by his society not so much about reducing a few weapons in Europe that strategically don't really have an awful lot of impact, but rather on what he does in terms of reforming the economy and the society. Certainly, it would be helpful to him to demonstrate as a new leader that he is able to accomplish something on the world stage, especially vis a vis the United States. But it's easy to overstate the impact that it will have domestically.

MacNEIL: Well, Bill Beecher, thank you for staying up so late and joining us from Brussels. James Schlesinger in Washington, Stephen Cohen in Princeton, and McGeorge Bundy in New York.

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4/26/87

Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger

An Arms Agreement—on Two Conditions

The former president and the former secretary of state offer their advice.

President Reagan has a historic opportunity to take a major step forward in American-Soviet relations. There is little doubt that a summit meeting will occur this year and that an arms control agreement will be signed. But whether this leads to a breakthrough toward peace depends on whether it is the right kind of a deal. That is still an open question.

How did we reach this point? There are two principal factors.

The first is Reagan's success in restoring American self-respect and military strength. He has made the United States worth negotiating with. No one can deny the decisive role of the Strategic Defense Initiative in bringing the Soviets to the negotiating table.

The second is that General Secretary Gorbachev needs a deal. He wants a relaxation of tensions with the West in order to pursue his desperately needed domestic reforms.

All attention is now focused on the possibility of an agreement on medium- and short-range missiles. With respect to medium-range missiles, Gorbachev offers to give up 922 warheads on SS-20 missiles if we give up 316 warheads on Pershing II and cruise missiles. He has also offered to destroy 142 short-range SS-12/22s and SS-23s. Each side would retain 100 warheads on medium-range missiles, with Moscow's based in Soviet Asia and ours in the United States. It seems almost too good to be true—an offer we apparently cannot refuse.

Why does a leader whose entire career was in the Communist Party with its emphasis on balance of power offer apparently unequal reductions? Gorbachev is by far the ablest of all Soviet leaders since the end of World War II. He has an acute intelligence, a forceful presence and a contagious charisma. He is making some bold domestic reforms. But this does not mean he is a philanthropist. He knows that the Soviet cuts do not reduce in any significant manner the Soviet capacity to attack Europe with nuclear weapons and that they increase the Soviet conventional threat to Europe. He seeks to advance the calculated purpose of weakening the ties between the United States and Western Europe and between Germany and the Atlantic Alliance.

If we strike the wrong kind of deal, we could create the most profound crisis of the NATO alliance in its 40-year history—an alliance sustained by seven administrations of both parties. Because we are deeply concerned about this danger, we who have attended several summits and engaged in many negotiations with Soviet leaders are speaking out jointly for the first time since both of us left office.

When NATO was created, faced with Moscow's massive conventional superiority, the allies chose to confront Soviet manpower by threatening to respond to a Soviet conventional attack with nuclear weapons. So long as the United States had superiority in strategic nuclear weapons, that strategy was credible. But since the late 1970s the Soviet strategic arsenal has grown to equal, and in land-based missiles to exceed, that of the United States. This meant that a nuclear war would involve scores of millions of American casualties in a matter of hours. We need not debate whether an American president would under these circumstances initiate strategic nuclear war in response to an attack on Europe. It is enough to recognize that if the Soviets believe he might not, deterrence could fail.

That is why NATO developed a doctrine—flexible response—which would permit a graduated application of its nuclear power. Medium- and short-range missiles placed on the continent of Europe restored the credibility of the threat of nuclear retaliation, if only because the Soviets had to calculate that the United States would not permit them to be overrun without using them. This was especially important for the Federal Republic of Germany, which, unlike France and Britain, has no nuclear weapons and, unlike Italy, has large Soviet armies on its borders. Three years ago, NATO governments overcame bitter Soviet-sponsored demonstrations to deploy these medium-range missiles.

It is regrettable that in the late 1970s the deployment of those weapons was justified solely on the ground that they were needed to balance the new Soviet SS-20 missiles and that Western statesmen said a withdrawal of the SS-20s would permit us to withdraw our missiles as well. In fact, these missiles were not needed to offset their equivalents. Their real function was to discourage Soviet nuclear blackmail of Europe by whatever weapon from whatever location and to raise the risk of nuclear retaliation by NATO to Soviet conventional attack. They closed a gap in deterrence caused by the apocalyptic nature of strategic nuclear war.

The Soviets' strategy since the end of World War II has been to exploit the West's fear of nuclear weapons by calling repeatedly for their eventual abolition. If we acquiesce in this strategy, we will create a far more dangerous world. Any Western leader who indulges in the Soviets' disingenuous fantasies of a nuclear-free world courts unimaginable perils.

If we eliminate American medium- and short-range forces in Europe without redressing the conventional imbalance, the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe will remain, and the

gap in deterrence to conventional attack will be reopened. Even after the proposed reductions the entire Soviet nuclear arsenal of 19,000 warheads can, if the Soviet Union chooses, be aimed at Western Europe from the Soviet Union a few hundred miles away. But given the catastrophic consequences of general nuclear war, the credibility of the strategic U.S. threat is eroding, all the more so if it must be initiated on behalf of distant allies and after we have just withdrawn our strategic missiles across an ocean.

Deterrence cannot be based on either U.S. battlefield nuclear weapons, because their range is too short, or on tactical bombers, because of the formidable Soviet air defenses. Reliance on battlefield nuclear weapons has two other disadvantages. It stakes the nuclear threat on the nuclear weapons most difficult to control by civilian leaders. Above all it would confine the use of nuclear weapons in effect to German soil.

Faced with such prospects no German government will be able to resist for long the siren song of denuclearization, on the one hand, or the acquisition of nuclear weapons, on the other. And this in turn would leave American forces in Europe without adequate nuclear protection.

In retrospect, NATO should not have offered the zero option in the late 1970s. But we have crossed that bridge. The Soviets have accepted our offer. But it would be a profound mistake to conclude the agreement in its present form. We must insist on at least two conditions:

1. No missiles in Asia. We must demand that the ~~zero~~ option eliminate all intermediate-range missiles worldwide. From just beyond the Ural Mountains, Soviet SS-20 missiles could still reach Germany and, being mobile, could quickly be moved into positions that threaten all of Europe. Also, given the enormous Soviet nuclear arsenal, the sole Soviet purpose in retaining 100 warheads in Asia is to intimidate China, Japan and Korea with American acquiescence. Finally, by permitting 100 warheads in Asia, the verification problem becomes enormous because that would allow Moscow to maintain its production lines and test firings.

2. Linkage to conventional balance. Since the missile reductions are slated to take place over five years, we should link the final phase of withdrawals to the elimination of the huge Soviet conventional superiority. The agreement must provide that negotiations to this end begin immediately and be concluded before the final phase of missile withdrawal begins. In particular, we must insist on the right of equal numbers of short-range missiles until the conventional balance is established. Otherwise, removing medium- and short-range nuclear weapons would simply make Europe safe for conventional war.

Our negotiators must hold their ground on these points. No deal is better than a bad deal. But that is not our choice. We can reach a good deal, for both sides, if we always keep in mind that Gorbachev needs a deal as much as we do. Indeed, if he is genuinely interested in peace, he should want an agreement that increases the security of both sides. Unilateral concessions now may bring a temporary respite but only at the cost of grave risks later.

In addition to arms control, it is vital that a summit convened to sign a missile agreement deal with the major political U.S.-Soviet issues. If summitry is to promote the chances of peace, the superpowers must address the potential causes of war. It is not weapons that cause war, but rather the political differences that lead to the use of those weapons. Therefore, when Reagan and Gorbachev meet, there must be significant progress toward resolving key political issues, such as the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Soviet arms shipments to Nicaragua and Soviet-sponsored subversion in Central America. Gorbachev has taken the first steps toward reform at home but has not retreated one inch from Moscow's posture abroad. Indeed, his policy can be said to be a subtler implementation of historic Soviet patterns. He has criticized Brezhnev, but he still enforces the Brezhnev Doctrine.

Every president has an understandable desire to ensure his place in history as a peacemaker. But he must always remember that however he may be hailed in today's headlines, the judgment of tomorrow's history would severely condemn a false peace. If President Reagan stands firm for the principles that he has maintained so steadfastly throughout his career, he will be able to sign the right agreement and make a significant step toward real peace in the world.

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James Schlesinger

REYKJAVIK AND REVELATIONS: A TURN OF THE TIDE?

For much of its first six years, the Reagan Administration has cruised along in its foreign policy in a manner both serene and enviable. The errors in nuclear policy that had marred our relations with Europe in President Reagan's first year were attributed to growing pains. Mistakes such as the Euro-Siberian gas pipeline controversy with the Europeans and the Administration's initial hard line toward the People's Republic of China were repaired with little permanent damage. Even a major blunder, our ill-starred intervention in Lebanon, was terminated quickly—and our forces extricated with such tactical skill that little permanent damage was done (save to our prestige and influence within the Middle East). Certain other actions—our support of El Salvador, our move into Grenada and our attack on Libya—however controversial at the outset, turned out to be generally successful and much of the initial criticism died away.

Meanwhile the Soviet Union was passing through a time of troubles. International dynamics in a world still significantly bipolar reflect to a large extent a kind of counterpoint between the United States and the Soviet Union. Consequently, the position and prestige of one superpower tends to vary inversely with the gains or losses of the other. At least until the accession of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union appeared plagued by bad luck and unable to deal with its many internal and external problems. President Reagan had had the good fortune to come into office as the Soviet Union went through three succession crises in a row. In addition to its internal drift, the U.S.S.R.'s policies were also marked by a series of blunders—from the walkouts at the INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) and START (Strategic Arms Reduction

James Schlesinger is Counselor, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, and Senior Adviser to Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc. He has been Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and Director of Central Intelligence.

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Talks) negotiations in Geneva, the heavy hand and threats directed against Western Europe, and the shooting down of a Korean Air Lines passenger jet. For much of the early 1980s, therefore, the Soviet Union wore the black hat in international affairs—and the United States benefited correspondingly.

Much, perhaps too much, has been made of the Soviet geopolitical offensive of the 1970s, but the Soviets did make significant gains in the Middle East and elsewhere. And, indeed, a geopolitical tide had been flowing toward the Soviets, at least since Watergate and perhaps since our earlier entanglements in Southeast Asia. Whatever its origins, throughout the 1970s American institutions had been severely challenged and the society had lost its self-confidence. One of President Reagan's greatest accomplishments was his contribution to the restoration of America's self-confidence, which resonated among America's allies, who had been troubled by the faltering United States of the 1970s.

In short, during the 1980s, the geopolitical tide that had been flowing toward the Soviet Union in the 1970s was reversed—and began to flow toward the United States.

In the sixth year of the Administration, in part reflecting the more effective stance of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev and in part reflecting simply the law of averages, the Administration's foreign policy was suddenly beset with difficulties. Even before the embarrassments of November—the revelations that our anti-terrorist policy had been undermined by secret sales of arms to Iran and that the proceeds of those sales had in part been used to fund the operations of the anti-Sandinista guerrillas in Nicaragua (in clear defiance of a congressional ban)—our foreign policy had been marred by both a sense of drift and serious blunders.

I shall here concentrate on two issues: East-West relations, particularly as affected by the Reykjavik summit; and White House mishandling of Third World security problems, particularly as revealed by the Iran/contra affair. There have been, however, additional problems, if subsidiary ones, that have further reduced the Administration's stature. The dramatic override of the President's veto of the South Africa sanctions bill indicated a misreading and a mishandling of congressional sentiment. The Administration had fallen too far out of touch with the congressional mood. The brief flap over the disinformation program directed against Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi reduced the credibility of the Administration abroad, but also

at home. The shooting down of an American cargo plane over Nicaragua (perhaps inevitable) with an American crew and an American survivor (certainly not inevitable) added to the Administration's vulnerability. Finally, the loss of Republican control of the Senate, particularly in light of the President's unprecedented campaigning, presaged further difficulties for the President.

The November revelations implied something far more serious than the normal lame-duck deterioration of an administration in its final years. They suggested a weakened executive—at best on the defensive, and quite possibly crippled. The fabled Reagan luck apparently had run out. The question now is quite simply: Has the tide that had flowed toward the United States in the early 1980s started to ebb?

II

The summit at Reykjavik represented simultaneously the culmination and the collapse (at least temporarily) of realistic hopes for arms control. To say that the summit was ill prepared is to indulge in classic understatement. Indeed, the entire performance at Reykjavik underscored the continuing validity of the diplomatic adage that leaders should go to summits not to negotiate, but to ratify what has already been agreed to. The President was led astray by an exaggerated faith in his powers of persuasion. There are indications that the summit's hasty design reflected the all too common domestic political priority: the quest for an arms control "success" before a midterm election. Not only was the summit ill prepared, it was quite badly executed with spur-of-the-moment proposals followed by spur-of-the-moment despair. It combined the worst aspects of earlier summits. It was as ill conceived as the Vienna summit of 1961; it had the worst outcome since the blowup of the Paris summit of 1960; and it rested upon utopian expectations not seen since the Yalta conference of 1945.

Nonetheless, the environment for a serious arms control agreement was the most favorable since the early 1970s. The auspicious environment had been created by the enhanced bargaining position of the United States, due to the Strategic Defense Initiative; by Mr. Gorbachev's strong desire to focus on improvements in the stodgy Soviet economy; and by the deep-seated Soviet wish to avoid a technological competition in arms with the Americans. At long last, the Soviet desire to avoid another turn of the screw in the arms competition seemed

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At Reykjavik, there had been little influence on the modern deterrence debate regarding nuclear disarmament. The ingredients of the security system included deterrence. It was not only massing forces to achieve the final goal of 1952 and the Strategic Defense Initiative, but also massing the administration's conventional forces to the point of the Eisenhower era. The nuclear weapons existed solely to maintain the Strategic Defense Initiative. The West could not afford to let negotiations, that started primarily unilateral, lead to an adequate conclusion.

Attitudes became more flexible, responsibility came to accept conventional weapons as sufficient in its conventional arms control. This was aided by the strategic stability of the two legs of the nuclear umbrella, which provided a comfortable level of security that could be rested for the long term.

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to have overcome their long-term inclination to try to extract marginal advantages in such negotiations. The Soviets were prepared to offer sharp reductions in their bloated strategic offensive forces, which represented the potential for a serious agreement, if the United States had been adequately prepared to exploit it. Yet, finally, it all turned into nothing. Reykjavik represented a near disaster from which we were fortunate to escape. It has quite likely forfeited the possibility of a major arms control agreement for the balance of the Reagan term. Perhaps the summit's only useful result is that it has changed what had been the universal European clamor for an arms control agreement into a keen European awareness that such agreements might seriously damage their security interests.

At Reykjavik the American negotiators appeared to have been little informed either on the exigencies imposed by Western deterrence strategy or on several decades of discussion and debate regarding both the possibilities and the limitations of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear weapons remain the indispensable ingredient in Western deterrence strategy. For a generation the security of the Western world has rested on nuclear deterrence. Its goal has been to deter not only nuclear attack but also massive conventional assault from the East. Failing to achieve the force goals outlined at the Lisbon conference in 1952 and the subsequent "New Look" of the Eisenhower Administration, the Western alliance came almost to embrace its conventional inferiority. Indeed, with the trip wire strategy of the Eisenhower years, conventional forces were stated to exist solely to determine the proper moment for unleashing the Strategic Air Command. It was taken as axiomatic that the West could not match "the Soviet hordes." Whatever its limitations, that strategy worked as long as the nuclear threat was primarily unilateral and until the Soviets began to develop an adequate counterdeterrent.

Attitudes began to change in the 1960s with the move toward flexible response. By the mid-1970s the European allies had come to accept the importance for deterrence of a stalwart conventional capability. Perhaps that capability would not be sufficient in itself to protect Western Europe against an all-out conventional assault, but with the mutual reinforcements provided by the strategic and theater nuclear weapons (the other two legs of the NATO defense strategy), it could provide a comfortable level of deterrence. There NATO doctrine has rested for the past decade. Despite the bitter controversies

regarding new deployments, nuclear weapons provide the glue that has held the Western alliance together. Indeed, the controversies themselves reflect an unstated acknowledgment of this critical role.

The American position at Reykjavik seems to have reflected no understanding of these simple fundamentals. Indeed, at one point in the negotiations the President had accepted Mr. Gorbachev's proposal that both sides eliminate all strategic offensive arms by 1996. Happily, the Administration has now backed away from this breathtaking proposal and insists that it represents only a long-term goal. But that impulsive, if momentary, agreement underscores the casual utopianism and indifferent preparation that marked Reykjavik.

Surely we must be more cautious in casting aside the existing structure of Western security before we are assured that an alternative truly exists. In the absence of the nuclear deterrent the Eurasian continent would be dominated by that nation with the most powerful conventional forces. The President may win plaudits from the National Conference of Catholic Bishops or from the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy or even from the left wing of the British Labour Party when he holds out his vision of "a world without nuclear weapons," but it endangers Western security and seriously weakens alliance cohesion.

Secretary of State George Shultz has expressed his confidence that, given their greater economic resources, the allies can create conventional forces superior to those of the Warsaw Pact. But such a view simply ignores the psychology, the long history, and even the geography of the *NATO* alliance. With serious economic strains, adverse demographic trends (sharply falling birth cohorts, particularly in Germany) and no draft in the United States, will the allies do in the 1980s what they were unwilling to do in the prosperous 1960s and early 1970s? Should we risk Western security on so flimsy a hope?

Even if we attribute the aberration of negotiators consenting to the elimination of all strategic weapons to their being swept away by the enthusiasm of the moment, what are we to make of the main American proposal to eliminate all ballistic missiles by 1996? It was put forward not on the spur of the moment but after some, albeit not very deep, reflection. It appears to have originated in the Department of Defense (under some suspicion of disingenuousness, in that the Soviets could never accept it and that it would "play well in Peoria"). The proposal

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was included, in a general way, in President Reagan's July letter to Mr. Gorbachev without any suggestion of timing—more as a long-term aspiration than a concrete proposal. For that reason the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not take it very seriously. But at Reykjavik it was—without prior consultation with the Congress, the allies or the Joint Chiefs—put forward as a concrete proposal to be achieved in ten years' time. Although the President and Secretary Shultz have backed away somewhat from this proposal, it is still supported by some senior Administration officials and remains a part of our proposal in Geneva. While, happily, it lacks the quixotic heedlessness of the elimination of all strategic nuclear weapons, it raises very serious questions and has been subject to no serious analysis. Indeed, the National Security Decision Directive calling for the study of the military implications of the elimination of ballistic missiles was not circulated until several weeks after Reykjavik.

For a quarter of a century the value of the nuclear triad (bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles) has been taken as axiomatic for America's military posture. Annually reiterated in the posture statements of various secretaries of defense, the value of the triad reflects not only the special features in targeting of each of the elements of the triad, but the desire to avoid putting all the principal deterrent eggs in one basket. As recently as 1983 the President, in accepting the report of the Scowcroft Commission, embraced this concept. The report pointed out that the triad would complicate any Soviet attack plan and would dissipate Soviet resources that might otherwise be concentrated against a single deterrent system: "Thus the existence of several components of our strategic forces permits each to function as a hedge against possible Soviet successes in endangering any of the others." The report went on to say, "the different components of our strategic forces would force the Soviets, if they were to contemplate an all-out attack, to make choices which would lead them to reduce significantly their effectiveness against one component in order to attack another." Space does not allow the spelling out of these technical details. Suffice it to say that at Reykjavik the Administration suddenly jettisoned 25 years of deterrence doctrine and the President's prior embrace of the Scowcroft Commission report. Without warning, without consultation with Congress or its allies, indeed without any prior analysis, the Administration proposed the abandonment of two of the three traditional legs of the triad.

Does no one in the Administration recall the days before ballistic missiles and the deep concern regarding the vulnerabilities of our bomber force, then deployed at only 55 Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases, susceptible to surprise attack? (That concern, needless to say, deepened with the initial Soviet deployments of intercontinental ballistic missiles.) The inevitable result, then and now, is the call for an airborne alert of the bomber force to limit its vulnerability on the ground. Does anybody in the Administration recall the lengthy dispute between the Congress and President Eisenhower, as the Congress pressed additional money on the Administration for airborne alert and the President argued that all it would lead to was "worn-out bombers"? A hypothetical bomber force of the 1990s would consist of many fewer bombers than in the 1950s, probably located on an even smaller number of main bases. Can anyone doubt that the concerns of the 1950s about its vulnerability would rapidly revive?

The ability of such a bomber force to penetrate Soviet air defenses would cause similar introspection and concern. The Administration itself has steadily emphasized that the Soviets invest far more than we do in "strategic defense." Most of that vast Soviet investment is in air defense. (By contrast, the United States, having accepted that Soviet ballistic missiles have essentially a free ride, has maintained only a skeletal air defense.) In the 1990s could our bombers be assured of penetrating the hundreds of radars, thousands of interceptors (with a look-down, shoot-down capability), and tens of thousands of surface-to-air missiles that will then constitute Soviet air defenses? Moreover, the Soviet air defenses would likely be even more formidable if we were to "share" our strategic defense technology with the Soviets, as the President has promised. How assured would we feel under those conditions?

For more than 20 years we have been confident that submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) were invulnerable. At Reykjavik we proposed to dispose of this leg of the triad. Do we really want to rid ourselves of what we have regarded as the invulnerable part of our deterrent—and depend wholly on air-breathing vehicles? The Administration argues that submarine-launched cruise missiles could to a considerable extent maintain some degree of invulnerability, as we eliminate the SLBMs. Do we seriously want to reduce radically the range at which our submarines can operate, forgo the advantages of long range embodied in the Trident ballistic missile and force

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Under the proffered conditions, the bulk of our retaliatory force would rest on bombers, located at a small number of bases and vulnerable to surprise attack. Would we really want to depend upon a surviving force of cruise missiles going against Soviet air defenses? Surely an administration that originally came into office stressing "the window of vulnerability" for our strategic forces should appreciate that under such conditions concern about the survival of our deterrent would once again escalate.

Finally, one must consider the budgetary consequences. Bombers, with their heavy requirements for manpower and fuel, tend to be quite costly, particularly if they are required to fly often in airborne alert. As we are procuring and operating this deterrent force of the future, and simultaneously rebuilding our air defenses and creating a ballistic missile defense, what portion of a relatively fixed defense budget would be absorbed? To what extent would our conventional military capabilities unavoidably be sacrificed—at the very moment that the need for further improvements in conventional defenses is being acknowledged throughout the alliance? At a minimum, it would appear that we should await the result of the belatedly ordered analyses before we press forward with the proposal to eliminate ballistic missiles.

One of the anomalies at Reykjavik was the contrasting treatment of the nuclear deterrent and the Strategic Defense Initiative. In Western strategy the nuclear deterrent remains the ultimate and indispensable reality. Yet at Reykjavik the President was prepared to negotiate it away almost heedlessly. By contrast, the Strategic Defense Initiative was treated and continues to be treated as if it were already a reality ("the key to a world without nuclear weapons") instead of a collection of technical experiments and distant hopes. The President proposed to deploy SDI in 1996. But by 1996 only a most rudimentary defense, based upon kinetic-kill vehicles, could be deployed. None of the well-advertised exotic defenses, including lasers and particle beams, could possibly be available until well into the 21st century. Thus, the proposed early deployment of this rudimentary ballistic missile defense would occur in the same year that the possession of ballistic missiles would

no longer be permitted. That would, of course, ease the problem of making the ballistic missile defense effective. (There is always a hypothetical ballistic missile threat sufficiently limited that it can make even a rudimentary defense effective.)

Even with the threat of ballistic missiles nominally eliminated, the President argues that an early deployment of a rudimentary strategic defense system is necessary as insurance against Soviet cheating. It would be very costly insurance indeed, and one may well wonder whether or not the resources invested in such a rudimentary defense would not be better invested in other military capabilities. However, the stakes would be high, much higher than the Administration understood at the time of Reykjavik. If we were actually to eliminate ballistic missiles and return to a retaliatory force based primarily on bombers located on a small number of SAC bases, our main retaliatory force would be extremely vulnerable. Even if the Soviets were to cheat only to the extent of hiding away a very small number of missiles, our main U.S. retaliatory force would be placed at risk.

One may be bemused by the President's preoccupation with SDI. At Reykjavik he was prepared apparently to sacrifice our entire strategic nuclear armament, but unprepared to compromise on outside-the-laboratory testing of SDI. One finds it hard to believe that preserving the freedom to test SDI is by itself of sufficient importance to determine whether to jettison or salvage the Western system of security based on nuclear deterrence. Nonetheless, we must accept the astonishing irony: it was the impasse over SDI that saved us from the embarrassment of entering into completed agreements from which subsequently we would have had to withdraw. Thus, SDI may already have made an invaluable contribution to Western security—not for the bright, if somewhat evanescent, future regularly proffered to us, but rather by preserving the elements of nuclear deterrence from our Administration's recklessness at Reykjavik. For that we must be permanently grateful to SDI—irrespective of the still uncertain outcome of the research and development effort.

To be sure, the preoccupation with SDI, plus Gorbachev's tactical blunder in failing to seize upon the President's acceptance of the notion of total strategic nuclear disarmament, saved us at Reykjavik. But one should pause and examine what might have been. For more than a decade we have sought to control the grossly inflated Soviet offensive forces, which in-

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orporate a major counterforce capability. Gorbachev offered to reduce Soviet strategic offensive forces by 50 percent. If the offer was genuine—and that could only be determined by extensive negotiations—it might have achieved the true goal of arms control: enhanced stability in the military postures of the two sides. To Gorbachev's predictable demands that the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty be strengthened (can we really have been surprised by his insistence on this point after all the Soviet statements of the past three years?), we should have responded by seriously addressing his legitimate concerns about the scope of SDI testing, rather than pursuing the tack of eliminating all ballistic missiles by 1996, which led the discussions down the grandiose, if futile and dangerous, road toward total nuclear disarmament.

What have been the reactions to the events at Reykjavik since the summit? Reykjavik may have been a marginal electoral success for the midterm elections, but it has been a foreign relations disaster. On the first point the Administration seems to have been quite satisfied by its mastery of the political technique it calls "spin control." White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan commented: "We took Reykjavik and turned what was really a sour situation into something that turned out pretty well." What that says quite simply is that the public relations impact on the American electorate is all-important, while the substance of arms control and foreign reaction are of negligible importance.

In Europe, however, the reaction was one of consternation, as the substance and process of the negotiations at Reykjavik became better understood. The Europeans, needless to say, were vastly disturbed to discover that such revolutionary changes in the Western security system affecting Europe could be proposed and negotiated without any prior consultation. But they were perhaps even more disturbed by the sudden realization that the American negotiators apparently proceeded at Reykjavik without the slightest understanding of the basis of the system of Western security. At a more specific, and perhaps lower, level of concern, there was exasperation at the casual proposal to eliminate the missiles placed in Europe after so much political travail. We had made the argument that missiles in Europe were essential to deterrence by linking forces in Europe to the larger American strategic deterrent. While one can argue that the Euromissile issue is more symbolic and

psychological than military, still it is hard for us to abandon the initial rationale.

Amid considerable distress, a hasty round of conferences was held. Soon British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, bearing a portfolio for all the European allies, appeared at Camp David to deliver a *reclama* on Reykjavik. The outcome, which set priorities for arms control, was highly satisfactory. It was agreed that priority should be given to major reductions in intermediate-range nuclear forces and a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons, and in the context of the elimination of conventional disparities, a ban on chemical warfare and a reduction in shorter-range systems within the European theater. Perhaps most significant, the long-standing strategy of NATO was reconfirmed.

Once again, as with the earlier rhetoric of SDI replacing (immoral) deterrence, Mrs. Thatcher helped save the Americans from their own folly. The selection of priorities, while sensible, was rather belated. The normal procedure is to establish priorities *prior* to negotiation—just as the normal procedure would be to study the consequences of eliminating ballistic missiles *prior* to making such a proposal. The Administration does appear to have backed away from its breathtaking discussions at Reykjavik in a manner equally breathtaking. For that, at least, we should be grateful.

Nonetheless, the consequences of Reykjavik remain serious. Though allied governments have been eager to put as good a face as possible on the summit, beneath the surface of public support they remain deeply disturbed at both the substance and the procedure of the Reykjavik negotiations. Their confidence in American leadership has been significantly weakened. In the immediate aftermath of the summit some began to cast around for alternative methods, other than American protection, to provide for their security. Although the initial alarm has now diminished, some residue remains.

With our allies we have gotten the worst of both possible worlds. On the one hand, the confidence of West European governments in the capacity of American leadership to protect the general interests of the alliance in negotiations has been seriously damaged. On the other hand, the publics and much of the press in Europe have been excited by the promise of major arms control agreements, and particularly the elimination of the Soviet intermediate-range threat directed against Western Europe. They have been persuaded that the elimina-

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tion of the dreaded SS-20 threat would have taken place had it not been for the American obstinacy about SDI. While the Soviets will remain unsuccessful in the near term in changing attitudes of governments, they have been given a fertile field to sow in the battle for public opinion.

Perhaps even more important in the long run, the President's embrace of the goal, both utopian and dangerous, of a world without nuclear weapons will inevitably weaken support for the strategy of nuclear deterrence upon which the defense of the West continues to rest. This is particularly true in Western Europe. It has already been seized by the British Labour Party and by the Social Democratic Party in West Germany in the run-ups to their respective elections. But it is also true in the United States. Once again, as with SDI, the President has been destructive in his judgment on deterrence. He has clearly done more to weaken deterrence than did the U.S. Catholic bishops in their 1983 pastoral letter.

The full effects of Reykjavik will probably never be known, as the summit has been wholly superseded in public discussion by the issues of arms for Iran and the illegal funding of the contras. Admittedly, these latter events appear more dramatic and have a greater impact on the public mind. They do constitute a serious embarrassment for the United States and provide the potential for a major diplomatic setback. Nevertheless, their inherent weight is much less than the negotiations at Reykjavik. They cannot significantly alter the military balance or significantly weaken Western security. By contrast, Reykjavik had the potential for upsetting the military balance, for suddenly vitiating Western military strategy, and for destroying the cohesion of the Western alliance. It is a pity that the more consequential shall have been overtaken by the less consequential if more dramatic. Reykjavik was a near disaster, and we should learn from it all that we can. Perhaps the best that can be said about the summit is that it was a *near* disaster. As the Duke of Wellington remarked after Waterloo: "It was the nearest-run thing you ever saw."

III

The tangled affair that falls under the rubric of the "arms scandal" has rocked both the government and the country. There has been public confusion regarding what our policies really are and a stunning drop in the President's approval rating. It has weakened and may cripple the Administration

far beyond the lame-duck status normally occurring at this stage in an administration. I do not intend here to attempt to disentangle the precise relationships among people and events, the contradictions and the illegalities; that is the task of the congressional review committees and the independent counsel. I shall instead attempt to examine the implications for American policy in the broadest sense and the impact upon our international position.

Whoever allowed this combination of events to proceed could not have designed his work more destructively. The combination of weapons supplied to the regime of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (on the scale of the American public's dislikes, Iran ranks well above the Soviet Union), the ransoming of hostages (not only were arms traded, but ransom money was raised explicitly for that purpose), and the illegal diversion of funds to the contras (for whom public sentiment has varied between indifference and hostility) was put together in a package and planted in the White House complex. It was a ticking time bomb, ingeniously contrived and placed close to the President. It was only a matter of time before it detonated.

The origins lie well back in the Administration's reading, strongly touched by ideology, of recent history. The setbacks that the United States experienced in the 1970s were attributed in no way to the limits of American power, but simply to the lack of will. The solution was equally simple: American strength and American will. Be determined. Overcome all obstacles. A cult of toughness became the norm. There was a widespread failure to understand the real restraints on American power and the American public's deep-seated ambivalence about the use of force, including the disguised use of force.

In the long run, heroic posturing is as unsatisfactory a basis for foreign policy as is moral posturing. Some in the Administration seemed to view *Rambo* not just as a highly implausible adventure tale, but rather as a profound political treatise. Administration policies were shaped by ideologues who lacked familiarity with American politics and what the American people are prepared to accept. Covert operations were not just a tool, useful if somewhat distasteful. Instead they were regarded as a noble instrument, a righteous cause—of which one could be proud in public—almost a crusade. There was frustration with the restraints placed upon presidential control of foreign policy. There was resentment of the new oversight requirements that Congress had imposed upon intelligence operations.

From its earliest run roughshod over these matters.

The CIA's violations precluded action and most particularly to the second Bush administration's policy toward the contras. With responsibility for direct action reside in the White House was not an "age-old" could be argued executive privilege. McFarlane committed "contra," from which less constrained in the law. For several years, Colonel Oliver North and directed operations, and morale.

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From its earliest days the Administration appeared willing to run roughshod over congressional prerogatives and sensibilities in these matters.

The CIA's violation of the first Boland Amendment, which precluded actions to overthrow the government in Managua, and most particularly the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, led to the second Boland Amendment, cutting off military aid to the contras. With the CIA at least ostensibly removed, responsibility for directing Central American operations came to reside in the White House. The National Security Council staff was not an "agency" under the Boland Amendment (or so it could be argued) and staff members could be protected by executive privilege. Former National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane commented, "We cannot break faith with the contras," from which one might infer that the Administration felt less constrained in breaking faith with either the Congress or the law. For several years NSC staff members, notably Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, raised money, provided intelligence and directed operations, all to sustain the contra effort and morale.

In order to avoid congressional oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency and to evade the intent of the Boland Amendment, these secret operations were effectively placed in the White House, close to the President. A generation's admonitions to keep all covert operations as far from the President as possible were discarded. The President himself seemed happy with the situation, ready to discuss the presumably covert operations in Central America. The borderline between overt and covert, sometimes difficult to define, became wholly obliterated. Also obliterated was the distinction between the permissible and the impermissible.

The seeds of the secret shift in policy toward Iran were sown in 1984 with the kidnapping of Americans, most notably William Buckley, whose abduction aroused the CIA. To the call to extricate our hostages was added the persuasive voice of Israel and the vague longing for a longer-term relationship with Iran. The massive political victory of the President in 1984 reinforced the frequently encountered White House hubris and further weakened a sense of limits to what the President could accomplish or what he was permitted to do. White House hubris was reinforced by a set of successes from Grenada to the *Achille Lauro*.

The selling of arms to Iran started in 1985 through the

Israelis, apparently in the belief that such transactions could remain secret. By 1986 weapons were being removed directly from service inventories for shipment to Iran. And then North and others on the NSC staff, already heady with past triumphs, truly went amok, diverting the bulk of the proceeds through a variety of secret bank accounts in Switzerland and the West Indies to the illegal support of the contra operation and perhaps to other beneficiaries, possibly including sympathetic politicians in the United States. The notion that this extensive network of operations, spanning at least 11 countries, could be kept secret reflected a touching, if naïve, faith in clandestinity.

The consequences hardly need to be spelled out. The nation is in an uproar. The Administration is in disarray. Its energies will be directed in large degree, at least until October 1987 (when the Senate says it will finish its investigation), toward attempting to control the damage. It has lost control over the national agenda. Public confidence in the President has been seriously eroded. The question remains whether the Administration can partially recover or whether it will be permanently crippled.

It should be noted that the principal damage in the public's view resulted from the shipment of arms to the despised ayatollah and the trading of those arms for the hostages. For the American public, this has counted far more than the "illegalities" associated with the diversion of public resources. Why?

America remains a nation with a strong idealistic bent. It does not believe that it is right to profess one policy, to press one's allies and others to follow that policy, and then in secret to do the reverse. The President, upon coming into office, asserted that terrorists should recognize that "retribution would be swift and effective." Countless voices have asserted that we will "never negotiate with terrorists." The public was urged to believe that this indeed was our policy. And here we suddenly are dealing with the hated ayatollah—with an Iran branded by the President as the principal example of those "outlaw states . . . run by the strangest collection of misfits, looney tunes and squalid criminals since the advent of the Third Reich."¹ Worse than that, here we are paying ransom,

¹ Address to the Annual Convention of the American Bar Association, July 8, 1985. The address was given a week or so before the President gave oral approval to the sale of arms through the Israelis. Apparently the President's speechwriters were not apprised of the prospective shift in policy.

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ation, July 8, 1985. The royal to the sale of arms were not apprised of the

arms for hostages—something that we proclaimed we would never do and have urged all others to refrain from doing. The public's shock was unavoidable. The diversion of funds appears far less reprehensible to the public.

A president must be true to his image. He is allowed a great deal of running room so long as he does not break an implicit social contract with the public: that he is a man who will not violate the public's deepest convictions, which he has come to personify. President Carter, rated high among presidents for his honesty, was sharply rebuked for his few fibs, which in sum were a fraction of those tolerated in other presidents. Why? Because the conviction that he conveyed to the public in 1976 was that he would restore goodness in Washington and never lie to the American people. Similarly, no one would ever expect President Reagan to be sending weapons to the ayatollah in exchange for hostages, or that his staff would be raising ransom money while the Administration proclaimed the need to stand up to terrorists. President Reagan was elected to be strong—to stand up to the nation's enemies. Trafficking with terrorists was not his image. It was not precisely Standing Tall.

The irony is that the President had both betrayed and been felled by that cantankerous American patriotism he had done so much to foster and had come to exemplify. The Republican governor of South Dakota, William Janklow, expressed it simply: "There are not five people out there who want to send arms to Iran. The only way we want to give them arms is dropping them from the bay of a B-1 bomber." Perhaps it was best put by a Chicago lawyer and Reagan appointee: "It's like suddenly learning that John Wayne had secretly been selling liquor and firearms to the Indians."

Much, far too much, has been made by the President's defenders of Roosevelt's trading overage destroyers to the British in 1940. It is a misleading parallel. This nation has moved beyond the Wilsonian notion of open covenants, openly arrived at. It accepts, although it is not happy with, the reality of secret diplomacy. But secret diplomacy in this country must be an extension of and in spirit with its open diplomacy. It cannot be the reverse of what we say publicly, especially (as in the Iranian case) when the secret action is in all-out opposition to what the American people want. Illegalities, which may excite the lawyers, although secondary in terms of public response, certainly do not help. All these marked the Iran/contra affair. The public outcry was scarcely surprising.

By contrast, none of this applies to Roosevelt's trading of overage destroyers to the British. Roosevelt had made no secret that he wanted the British to survive (and win!). His announced policy had been: all aid to the Allies, short of war. Nor had he made much of a secret of his loathing for Hitler's Germany. That had been clear since his "Quarantine the Aggressor" speech in 1937. Moreover, his foreign policy goal was one approved by the American people. The nation certainly preferred the Allies and disliked the Axis; it just did not want to become involved in the war. Finally, though no doubt of lesser importance, we got precisely what we traded for. We received bases that all admitted were valuable for the defense of the western hemisphere. That the Iranians conned us on the release of the hostages simply added insult to injury.

Finally, there is the national attitude toward clandestinity. While the country has moved well past Henry Stimson's "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail," it still remains deeply uneasy about clandestine operations, especially those originating from within the White House. Those who are fascinated by clandestinity, from the time of the White House plumbers to the time of Colonel North's operations, have failed to understand this deeply held public attitude. The public is prepared to accept clandestine activities, but only when they seem clearly required. Wholesale clandestinity brings to the surface all of the public's deep-seated ambivalence.

Adequate public support is fundamental to the carrying out of foreign policy in this society. The need for any secret diplomacy to be consistent with our open diplomacy and our publicly expressed goals is accepted by the American people, is manifest. The need to be circumspect about clandestine operations—and not to give way to the impulse of the "cowboys"—is essential for retaining public support. Those who advise any president, including Mr. Reagan, otherwise do not understand the spirit of the American democracy or the exigencies for carrying out foreign policy in this society.

IV

We must now assess the consequences of the arms scandal at home and abroad.

In the first place, the President has been dramatically weakened. His diminished credibility, with the Congress and with American elites generally, means that he will be able to provide little positive leadership in foreign policy for the balance of his

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term. His proposals will be greeted with skepticism at best. Moreover, his standing with the public can be only partially restored—and then more in terms of affection than high regard for his leadership. One of the truly astounding reactions to the arms scandal was reflected in the response to one question in a recent *New York Times/CBS* poll: "Whom do you trust more to make the right decisions on foreign policy—Ronald Reagan or Congress?" The public chose Congress over the President 61 percent to 27 percent. The public may have its difficulty with the practical and constitutional questions involved, but it is a truly stunning judgment on the capability of the executive branch.

Yet the impact on foreign policy may be modest. Congress is firmly under the control of the moderates. American foreign policy thus should remain quite stable—perhaps too stable. The wilder blades of the Watergate Congress have been removed or have "matured." There will be little repetition of the bizarre attitudes and turbulent debates of the early 1970s. Nonetheless, it is equally clear that Congress is hard-pressed to provide useful new initiatives. Thus, American policy over the next two years will likely turn out to be a holding pattern.

The controversy regarding the arms scandal has acquired a momentum of its own. It will roll on, even to the point of public boredom. White House attempts to suggest that Oliver North "acted alone" or that rogue elephants at the NSC were out of control will prove ineffective. First, whatever their excesses, Poindexter and North clearly were responding to the policy vibrations within the White House. Second, to suggest that no one knew what the President's staff was doing is perhaps even less reassuring than that this activity was authorized. The "explanation" that the President's staff was out of control is a rather desperate alibi; its only utility is to obviate the charge of complicity in illegalities. After all, just who was nursing this would-be Ludendorff in the basement of the White House?

Finally, and perhaps most important: clearly it was the President who authorized the arms for Iran and the trading of arms for hostages. The rest, including the raising of ransom money and the illegal diversion and use of funds, may indeed have been extracurricular. But the propitiation of the ayatollah's regime (under the guise of working with Iranian moderates) and the willingness to ransom hostages—both in conflict with our stated policy—are acknowledged to be the President's responsibility. Those are the issues about which the public is

concerned. For the public the diversion of funds is a rather recondite legal point. Consequently hopes for a Reagan recovery—other than as a grandfather figure—would appear modest at best.

The consequences abroad complement those within the United States. The loss in credibility of American foreign policy has been serious. It will be a long time before any American attempt to obtain backing for an anti-terrorist policy will be regarded as more than a pretense—or will elicit as much support as derision. In Europe the distress over the inept performance of the Americans at Reykjavik was reinforced by the belief that the Americans had been both weak and deceitful in selling arms to Iran and in their stance against terrorists. Unlike Reykjavik, however, these matters do not seriously undermine Western European security. Confusing, irritating, embarrassing they may be, but they scarcely impinge on Europe's vital interests. As a consequence, the initial European response—unlike that after Reykjavik—was a mixture of scorn and irritation. After all, Europeans are not above a touch of *schadenfreude* when the Americans are making fools of themselves—so long as it does not threaten European security.

Europe's initial anger and contempt, however, rapidly turned into deep concern as it became evident that the United States was going into a serious political crisis, different from but perhaps as severe as Watergate. It suggested that the United States might be preoccupied with internal matters for two more years and that, at best, it could provide little international leadership and at worst might be entirely diverted from its international responsibilities. So the initial smugness has given way to serious alarm. But Europeans do tend to exaggerate the impact of a political crisis in the United States on its ability to function internationally. The separation of powers is regarded by foreigners as the bane of the American political system. There is little understanding of the beneficial aspects of the separation of powers or of how Congress to a large extent can substitute for and provide stability when the executive is in crisis.

The post-Watergate experience is misleading. American foreign policy will proceed largely unaffected. There will be no innovations, but there will be no drastic changes. But the perception of American weakness and political stalemate may be as important as the reality—especially coming after Reykjavik. Loss of confidence in the United States will certainly lead

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to some loss of alliance cohesion and may lead to unwise actions by several of the European states.

The effect in the Middle East may be more far-reaching. In so volatile a region, it would seem hard to increase instability. But we may just have turned that difficult trick. The government of Israel has been embarrassed. The governments of the moderate Arab states (excepting Saudi Arabia) are angry and dismayed. The American position has been weakened throughout the Arab world, including Saudi Arabia, which was itself involved with the propitiation of Iran. Iran's and Khomeini's prestige have both been increased. (That has not helped the moderates, such as they are, within Iran.) The position of Iraq has been weakened—with all that this implies for control over Middle Eastern oil. If it has been our purpose to terminate the Iran-Iraq war, we have succeeded only in lengthening it.

Saudi Arabia has been encouraged to turn toward Teheran. Iranian influence in Riyadh has grown. The dismissal of Saudi Oil Minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani and the movement of Saudi products across the Persian Gulf to assist their hereditary enemy against their Arab brother bear witness to that. Within OPEC, Iranian influence has grown; this may be unimportant for now, but potentially highly significant in the 1990s.

As the political difficulties in the Middle East increase, we should be more aware than we are of the accelerating dependence of the United States on the oil fields of the Persian Gulf. Low oil prices—in the absence of any effort to sustain the domestic oil industry—are taking their toll. American production is falling by roughly half a million barrels a day each year. The rig count is off from its peak by more than 80 percent. By 1990 it appears that we will be importing more than 50 percent of our oil, over nine million barrels a day. And the decline in U.S. production will likely accelerate as we hit the decline curve at Prudhoe Bay. As we gradually, and more or less heedlessly, increase our dependency upon the Persian Gulf—and all that that implies in terms of reduced leeway for American foreign policy—we may have additional reasons to regret this series of actions that has further damaged our credibility in the Middle East.

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The Reagan foreign policy record has no monuments like the breakthrough to China, the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement or an effective arms control agreement. Until now it has

been characterized as "no hits, no runs, no errors"—although the last phrase must now regrettably be dropped. The great accomplishment of Ronald Reagan has been much more psychological and political. He has presided over, and through the ebullience of his personality contributed to, the restoration of American self-confidence and public confidence in our institutions, particularly the presidency. Abroad he has presided over a sharp rise in American prestige (and therefore perceived power), reinforced by a sharp decline in Soviet prestige during its recent time of troubles. These were major accomplishments, but they are now seriously threatened. Public confidence in our institutions has been shaken once again. There are signs of a return of public cynicism. Although one should not expect a return to the mood of the 1970s, none of this can help national strength and unity. Internationally our prestige and influence have received a serious blow, though perhaps more from Reykjavik than from the arms scandal. The great accomplishment of the Reagan years has been reduced, even if it has not been brought low.

The tide that began with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and increased in force in the early 1980s has now ceased to flow toward the United States and has begun to ebb. To what extent will that benefit the Soviet Union? To what extent will the tide flow strongly in the Soviet direction? No doubt, the Soviet Union will benefit. But the Soviet image has been badly marred by its blunders, by its relative technical backwardness and by its economic weaknesses. As a consequence, the Soviet Union fortunately does not now appear to be in a position to take full benefit from the regrettable setback to America's prestige.

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An Interview with Richard Nixon

The zero option, he says, can be a step toward a "comprehensive compromise"

As Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev head toward an agreement to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, the deal has become the object of intense controversy. Critics of this so-called zero option say it would "decouple" the defense of the U.S. from that of Western Europe: the less NATO can rely on American nuclear weapons in Europe, the more it will be at the mercy of the numerically superior conventional forces of the Soviet bloc.

Not until this week has Richard Nixon spoken out publicly on the subject. In a 90-minute interview at his Manhattan office with TIME Deputy Chief of Correspondents John F. Stacks and Washington Bureau Chief Strobe Talbott, the former President elaborated on an article that he and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger were writing for the Los Angeles Times Syndicate. In it they propose what Nixon calls a "good negotiating position" for turning the zero option from a blunder

into a "major step for peace." Kissinger had earlier been a scathing critic of the zero option; now that he has joined his old boss in what amounts to a qualified endorsement of the plan, the Administration may face less domestic opposition to the summit.

In his TIME interview, Nixon also gave his own recommendations of how the summit might be used to re-establish "linkage" between the "big issues" of strategic offense and strategic defense. Excerpts:

Gorbachev is the ablest of the Soviet leaders I've met. He's charismatic, eloquent and highly intelligent. If he were a candidate in our elections, he'd be a surefire winner. He's even interested in reforms. But he's not a philanthropist. So why is he accepting the zero option? Why is he willing to give up more intermediate-range warheads than we would have to give up?

It's because he's playing chess while we're playing checkers. He's not just looking at numbers of weapons. He's looking at the board in broader political and military terms. He has to be taking pleasure that the prospect of this proposal is causing consternation in Europe. He wants to decouple the U.S. from Europe.

But I think Gorbachev has another motive. When I saw him last July for an hour and 45 minutes, I told him that Ronald Reagan was a very popular leader and that Gorbachev should look beyond the Reagan presidency. If Reagan leaves office without having achieved an agreement, he could be a formidable opponent of any agreement his successor reaches. It's possible that Gorbachev now wants to get Reagan involved in arms control, give him a stake in the process, so that he won't mobilize opposition to it in the future.

So what should we do? We've made an offer. The Soviets have accepted it. We can argue about whether it should have been made in the first place. I can't buy the line [propounded by Secretary of State George Shultz] that the Soviets have put us in a box, but it's a "wonderful box to be in." Dean Acheson titled his memoirs *Present at the Creation*. Well, if I'd been present at the creation of the zero option in 1981, we'd never have gone ahead with it, because it reduces the credibility of our deterrent. Nevertheless, that bridge has been crossed. We'd be in an impossible position if we didn't go forward.

So there will be a summit, and there will be an agreement at the summit. The question is, How can we use the agreement to make progress on fundamental issues? If we're going to have the zero option in Europe, we've got to have it in Asia too. The Soviets' warheads allowed in Asia are aimed at the Chinese, with whom I'm somewhat familiar, and at the Japanese and Koreans. If we really press to get rid of those weapons, Gorbachev would have difficulty turning us down. Also, remember that the goal of arms control is not just to reduce the danger of war but to reduce the danger of blackmail, and that's why we need to be concerned about Soviet conventional superiority. The Soviets have stonewalled on that. Now it's time to tackle that problem. I think we

should make a condition that at the end of the five-year period, when we are removing our cruise and Pershing missiles from Europe, the last withdrawals should not take place unless the problem of Soviet conventional superiority has been rectified.

There's also the question of strategic arms. Let's keep the zero option in perspective. If we get rid of all those missiles covered by the offer, we're still talking about less than 3% of the 50,000 warheads in the world. We're not addressing the main issue.

We've got to disabuse ourselves of two myths. One is that we can eliminate nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. Jimmy Carter talked about that goal, and so has Ronald Reagan. But it isn't going to happen. Nuclear weapons aren't going to be abolished, and they're not going to be uninvented. Moreover, nuclear weapons have helped to keep the peace for 40 years. The other myth is that we're going to render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete" [a favorite Reagan phrase] with a perfect defense [the Strategic Defense Initiative]. Both myths have got to go.

What we've got to do is re-establish the linkage between our concern with the Soviet superiority in land-based nuclear weapons and the Soviets' concern with SDI. SDI is very useful for developing offense-defense linkage. One way for us to counter their offensive buildup is to defend our missile sites. We should make clear to the Soviets that we'll do this only to the extent necessary, given the threat that their missiles pose to our deterrent. We tell them that we're going to protect not our population but our deterrent, and that we're willing to negotiate on deployment of a defensive system if the Soviets reduce their big, most threatening missiles and reduce the ratio of their warheads to our deterrent forces.

I call this the "comprehensive compromise." It's simply not going to work to tell this President to give up SDI. What I'm proposing is that SDI should go forward, concentrating on defense of our missile sites. Then you'll be able to have negotiations with the Soviets on offense.

The offense-defense linkage that we established in 1972 with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks is the basis of the kind of linkage we should have today. In SALT I the Soviets wanted to limit only defense. We were concerned about their offensive buildup, so we insisted on including limits on offense as well. We're in the same situation now. They want to limit defense, and we want to limit offense. I'm saying, let's talk about how to do both together. ■



NIXON—OUTLINE

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Les Aspin

Eliminate Battlefield Nuclear Weapons First

The Reagan administration has embraced the concept of eliminating nuclear missiles from Europe with an enthusiasm unseen in an administration that treated arms control like a pariah for its first six years in office.

I would like to welcome any convert to the cause. My one problem with the Reagan conversion is that it exudes more zeal than rationality. The Reagan plan for nuclear weapons in Europe would have us eliminate the weapons we should keep and keep the weapons we should eliminate.

There are three categories of nuclear weapon in Europe. First, there are long-range intermediate-range nuclear forces, or LRINF. (The terminology is ridiculous, but we're stuck with it.) These are missiles with a range of 600 to 3,000 miles. Second, there are short-range intermediate-range nuclear forces, or SRINF. These are missiles with a range of 300 to 600 miles. Finally, there are battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons, which include land mines, artillery shells and truly short-range missiles.

Both we and the Soviets have long-range INF missiles. Ours are the Pershing II and GLCMs whose deployment in the early 1980s prompted so many antinukes marches in Europe. As for short-range INF missiles, we have none and the Soviets about 140. Both of us have thousands of battlefield nuclear weapons.

Of the three categories, the most dangerous are the battlefield nuclear weapons. In the event of a Soviet attack, allied forces will be struggling to avoid losing ground, and commanders will be asking to use their battlefield nuclear weapons

before their positions are overrun. In the most tense and unnerving days of any war—the first few days—anxious officials will be faced with a decision on resorting to nuclear weapons. They will confront the worst choice anyone can face: use 'em or lose 'em.

We ought to be moving nuclear weapons away from the battlefield. Modern technology gives missiles fired from a thousand miles away roughly the same accuracy as an artillery shell fired from a dozen miles away. And a missile sitting a thousand miles from the battlefield has two other advantages: first, it is in no danger of being overrun, and second, it is much easier for NATO headquarters and political leaders to keep control over use.

But what are we negotiating with the Russians? Ronald Reagan has proposed eliminating all long-range INF missiles. Mikhail Gorbachev has proposed that we eliminate both long-range and short-range INF missiles from Europe, and Secretary of State George Shultz has accepted that as the goal of the upcoming Geneva talks. That will leave us with battlefield nuclear weapons—precisely the ones we ought to be eliminating.

Reagan is not a convert to arms control. He is a nuclear disarmer. Disarmers simply want to abolish whole categories of nuclear weaponry, thinking the world is better off by virtue of our having fewer numbers of weapons.

But the point is not just to reduce numbers. The point is to reduce the chances of an outbreak of nuclear war. In that regard, some nuclear weapons are more dangerous than others. Battlefield nuclear weapons are one of the most dangerous.

Silo-based missiles that are vulnerable to attack are another. Again, the danger is that, if you don't use them, you take the chance of losing them.

Ironically, the battlefield weapon problem is one we have the ability to solve unilaterally—one of the rare instances where unilateralism is a real option. We ought to replace battlefield nuclear weapons unilaterally with weapons of greater range. Don't even try to negotiate with the Soviets—we'll never reach a verifiable agreement. Some of these weapons are so small one man can carry them. But the double zero agreement we are working on with the Soviets—zero LRINF and zero SRINF—makes such a unilateral restructuring illegal.

It all comes down to a question of the purpose of arms control. While it would be nice to reduce the numbers of weapons, that isn't the real point of arms control—blind submission to reductions could actually make the world less safe. While it may be desirable to reduce Pentagon budgets, that isn't the real purpose of arms control either—less reliance on nuclear weapons actually means more reliance on conventional weapons, which is a more costly route to take. The purpose of arms control—the bottom line, in today's parlance—is to make the outbreak of nuclear war less likely.

By that definition, neither the ideas of Ronald Reagan nor the ideas of Mikhail Gorbachev pass muster.

The writer, a Democratic representative from Wisconsin, is chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

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The Kissnix Factor

WASHINGTON

Who'd a thunk it: a dozen years after the death of détente, after a decade of Reaganaut criticism about a "fatally flawed" pair of SALT treaties, comes now Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger — together again — to warn that the Reagan Administration may be going soft on the Russians.

In their first syndicated collaboration, our two foremost strategic thinkers complain about the zero option, brainchild of the Reagan hawks, in which the superpowers would turn the clock back to the days before the big Soviet intermediate-range missile escalation.

Not good enough, according to Kissnix: the presence of our nuclear missiles in Europe now offsets the Soviet advantage in tanks, planes and troops. Not only should we refuse to allow 100 missiles to remain to threaten the Far East, we should put a new condition on the deal we have long offered in Europe: Remove all missiles only when the Russians eliminate their conventional superiority. (Senator Sam Nunn, who shows signs of going squishy on S.D.I., supports this approach, as do Europeans who want their defense on the cheap.)

Kissnix is rebutted by a faction called Shultzinze, which says: We have to be willing to take yes for an answer. If we renege on our offer now, after having won our point, we will lose all momentum toward arms reduction.

Who's right — the out-of-office former détenteniks turned neo-hardliners, or the in-office former hardliners turned neo-détenteniks? The moorings of mind-set have slipped and pundits are forced to order à la carte. One man's selections:

1. *The Kissnix criticism is right to insist on a "real zero" on medium-range missiles. The emplacement of 100 missiles to threaten China, Japan and Korea is too good a deal for the Russians, and would make I.N.F. verification 10 times more difficult.*

One way to get down to real zero would be to place our countervailing 100 missiles in our Aleutian Islands, no matter how Alaska's Senator Ted Stevens kicks; that deployment would make useless the big Soviet Pacific naval base at Petropavlovsk. By taking advantage of "Seward's Folly," we could negotiate away each side's final 100 medium missiles entirely. (This would also remind Far Eastern trade predators that "protection" has another meaning.)

2. *The Kissnix approach is wrong to insist on linkage of nuclear reduction to conventional reduction.*

There is good linkage and bad linkage. It makes stabilizing sense to link

space shield development to reductions in offensive intercontinental missiles; it also makes sense to link progress on arms reduction to Soviet behavior on human rights, invasion of neighbors, support of the subversion of Central America and intensity of espionage. As Kissnix has long posited, weapons don't cause wars; warmaking policies cause the use of weapons.

Secretary Shultz has been suckered into public concentration on one medium-range treaty and should shift the world focus to good linkage, like the need to reduce the dangerous number of Soviet ICBM's and for the Russians to pull out of Afghanistan.

Bad linkage is all-or-nothing bargaining that gets nothing. Linkage, as we saw in the fast shuffle that was Reykjavik, can cut two ways: We were proceeding on a series of negotiations when Mr. Gorbachev suddenly

Good linkage, bad linkage.

revealed at the end that everything was linked to the abandonment of S.D.I. testing. That's the customary Soviet negotiating trick, as Ed Rowney, the man who does not flip-flop, points out: the threat of losing all gives the Russians leverage at the eleventh hour.

Bad linkage also undermines progress by avoiding sacrifice. Reduction of nuclear arms in Europe, which is inexorable, means that Europe will have to spend more to defend itself. The odd decouple is a fact; the American presence will one day be absent, and Europe will or will not assume the burden of its own defense. The U.S. can negotiate time for this transition to continental independence, but we should not delay nuclear reduction until the Russians become the Swiss, embracing general disarmament.

3. *Both Kissnix fears and Shultzinze hopes must focus on verifiability.*

Ever since Anatoly Dobrynin predicted a future for on-site inspection at a Les Gelb dinner party in Alexandria six years ago, the Russians have been talking verification. Now, this week in Geneva, we will see how far they are prepared to apply glasnost specifically to their means of waging war. If the past is any indication, they will offer stunts and propose that the details be worked out later:

No deal. The safety of the world is in the details. □